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The recent threat of climate change has exacerbated the inherent risks in smallholder farming such 
as soil degradation, resulting in an unprecedented decline in agricultural yields in developing 
countries. This has threatened the livelihoods of large segments of populations that are heavily 
dependent on agriculture for survival in these regions. This dissertation focuses on identifying 
barriers and enablers of effective management of these risks, with an aim of coming up with 
potential policy interventions that can reduce vulnerability to the mentioned risks. To achieve this, 
the dissertation utilizes various methods and approaches as well as diverse datasets in two 
countries in sub Saharan Africa i.e. Namibia and Kenya. 
Diversification into non-farm activities is seen by many as a risk management strategy in rural 
areas where highly variable low farm incomes are transformed into stable high non-farm incomes, 
thus improving the welfare of the rural populations. While this theory of change is uncontested, 
the importance that the agricultural sector plays as a source of livelihood for rural populations, as 
well as food provisioning for urban populations, cannot be downplayed. This is more so given the 
limited non-farm opportunities in developing countries and the exponential population growth in 
these countries. The two factors combined impede on the envisioned transformation of rural 
production sectors and also create a sub-population of food insecure urban poor due to rural-urban 
migration. To mitigate these problems, rural agricultural development is still paramount and 
strategies that enhance resilience to risks in the sector are still vital. Chapter 2 of this dissertation 
focuses on this issue and addresses how farm diversification can be leveraged for improved food 
security in the rural areas, which has potential spill-over effects to other segments of the 
population. Focussing on northern Namibia, the study evaluates how different levels of 
diversification in both crop and livestock farming affect household food security outcomes i.e. per 
capita food expenditure and dietary diversity score. The study employs relatively new econometric 
methods in these type of studies to evaluate the joint determinants to both crop and livestock 
diversification, as well as their singular and joint effect on mentioned food security outcomes. The 
results show that high levels of diversification in either enterprise leads to high food security 
outcomes. 
Combined with climate change adaptation strategies that create resilience of agricultural 
production to climatic shocks, the use of sustainable agricultural intensification practices can 
further enhance productivity in the sector. Inputs like inorganic fertilizer, organic manure and 
improved seeds can further build on resilient systems to improve yields. Chapter 3 of this 




be used to incentivize take up of such practices at the farm level. The study evaluates how the 
emergence of large traders in smallholder grain markets can drive the uptake of inorganic and 
organic fertilizer and improved seeds. The study thus expands the intervention space available to 
policy makers who have in the past resorted to potentially distortionary direct policies in the input 
markets e.g. through subsidy provision, as well as in the output markets e.g. through regulation of 
prices. To achieve this, the study uses a large panel dataset from Kenya spanning over a decade 
to evaluate how engagements between farmers and these market actors can be leveraged to drive 
adoption of these sustainable intensification inputs. Results show that engagements between large 
grain traders and farmers enhance use of inorganic fertilizer. There is no evidence that these 
engagements lead to enhanced use of improved seeds or manure. However, past use of improved 
seeds and manure are shown to affect their subsequent use, implying path dependency in the use 
of these sustainable inputs hence low dis-adoption rates. 
Traditional tecnnology adoption stidues show that access to information is a critical success factor 
for the uptake of new technology. Proxy variables for information access, for example proximity 
to extension services or frequency of extension contact, have consistently been shown to be 
positively correlated with technology adoption. In the context of climate change, access to weather 
information can be a critical factor to adoption of adaptation technology. Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation deals with this issue and assesses whether provision of weather information to farmers 
can enhance adoption of improved farming technologies that are resilient to climatic shocks. The 
study focuses on northern Namibia where access to such information, as the study shows, is very 
limited. A framed experiment approach is utilised to evaluate how climate change-induced 
uncertainty affects farmers’ decision making in a farming season, based on their elicited 
behavioural attitudes towards risk and uncertainty. Further, the study tests whether providing 
weather information that reduces this uncertainty leads to adoption of technologies that are welfare 
improving. Lastly, the demand for weather information is assessed by eliciting the willingness to 
pay for information under various levels of weather uncertainty. Results indicate that high levels 
of uncertainty dampen uptake of welfare improving technologies, regardless of individual 
attitudes towards uncertainty. Availing of weather information leads to welfare improving 
technology choice, given the prevailing levels of weather uncertainty. There is also a high demand 
for weather information which is shown to increase with increase in the level of weather 
uncertainty. 
The chapters in the dissertation therefore identify key policy variables that can be used to manage 




farming. Access to comprehensive climate information encompassing weather information and 
climate change-specific management information on both crop and livestock farming is shown to 
be a key factor in the uptake of adaptation strategies like use of resilient inputs and farm 
diversification. Interventions along the value chain like teaming up with large market actors in a 
private-public engagement is shown to be a potential pathway towards enhancing uptake of 
sustainable intensification inputs. Other policy variables like credit provision, high education and 
access to off-farm incomes are also key in explaining uptake of risk management strategies by 
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Many livelihoods in developing countries are directly depended on the natural resource base, the most 
important being agricultural production. Without investments to boost resilience of agricultural 
production against adverse changes, these livelihoods remain exposed and vulnerable. This is more 
so because most of the agricultural production in developing countries is characterized by 
smallholder, rain-fed cultivation with little use of intensification inputs (inorganic fertilizer and 
improved seeds) and mechanization. Such production systems are very vulnerable to adverse changes 
to the climate and changes to soil quality, such as the continued soil degradation in developing 
countries and the recent phenomena of climate change. Adaptation to stressors like climatic shocks 
and soil degrading factors create resilience in production systems such that these systems are able to 
resist shock disturbances or recover to their original state of productivity after shock (Gil et al. 2017).   
For the most part, literature and policy on agricultural development in developing countries has 
centred on enhancing the uptake of improved technologies at the smallholder household level for 
higher yields. Adverse changes in the natural environment (soil and climate) are necessitating a 
rethink to this approach. Population pressures experienced in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, has 
meant that the same plots of land are cultivated season after season leading to soil nutrient depletion, 
soil infertility and a stagnation in yields (Drechsel, Dagmar, and de Vries 2001). Low use of soil 
fertility enhancing inputs further contribute to nutrient mining. Evidence also shows that at a certain 
level of soil infertility, the soil loses its ability to absorb nutrients from inorganic fertilizers, further 
enhancing demand-side factors for non-use of the input given the low profitability (Marenya and 
Barrett 2009). 
The recent global change phenomena is by far proving to be the biggest adverse change in the natural 
environment to threaten agricultural production and consequently many livelihoods dependent on 
agriculture. The impacts of climate change are worsening the low input use - soil infertility problem 
that has pervasively contributed to sub-optimal productivity frontiers, through major climate stressors 
like droughts, floods and seasonal weather fluctuations like dry spells and early/late cessation of rains. 




precipitation in the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region, leading to a projected decline of up to 25%-
30% in crop yields by the year 2030 (UNEP 2015).  
Regarding soil degradation, while some degree of this phenomena is driven by nature, the problem is 
largely exacerbated by human practices (Karlen and Rice 2015). Unsustainable land use practices like 
continuously cultivating the same piece of land with no fallow periods, low use of organic and 
inorganic fertilizer, minimal uptake of soil amendment practices, all lead to mining of important soil 
minerals rendering soils infertile (Kamau et al., 2014; Tittonell et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2006). In 
addition, low productivity given low soil fertility may led to opening up more forest cover to create 
additional land for cultivation, further degrading soils through exposure to surface run offs and wind 
erosion.   
Diminished agricultural productivity from climate change impacts and soil degradation leads to food 
shortages and rising food prices which affect both the rural and urban poor, entrenching food 
insecurity and poverty in large segments of the developing world’s population (Leichenko and Silva 
2014; Muller et al. 2011; Ahmed, Diffenbaugh, and Hertel 2009; Hertel, Burke, and Lobell 2010). 
The coping strategies undertaken by households in the aftermath of climatic shocks such as sale of 
assets and withdrawing kids from school, further entrench household poverty traps (Carter et al., 
2007; van den Berg, 2010). With more than 52% of all fertile, food producing soils globally now 
being classified as degraded, soil degradation needs to be recognised as one of the most pressing 
problems facing humanity alongside climate change and the two should be addressed simultaneously 
(Young, Orsini, and Fitzpatrick 2015). Soil degradation is defined as the decline in any or all of the 
characteristics which make soil suitable for producing food (Young, Orsini, and Fitzpatrick 2015). 
Thus degraded soils are incapable of supporting agriculture even in times of good climatic conditions. 
Evidence shows that adoption of simple sustainable agricultural intensification practices (SAIPs) can 
lead to restoration of soil fertility and an increase in crop yields (Kassie et al. 2008; Kihara et al. 2016; 
Marenya and Barrett 2007). These practices include inter alia; conservation agricultural practices like 
minimum/zero tillage, crop rotations and intercropping, retention of crop residues and cover crops; 
soil and water conservation practices (SWCs); application of organic manure; and use of 
intensification inputs like inorganic fertilizers and improved seed. With soil management practices 




to absorb nutrients from intensification inputs like inorganic fertilizer, therefore raising yields.  
Improved seeds also function well under the fertile soils.  
Incidentally, most of the above mentioned sustainable intensification practices are part of a collection 
of climate change adaptation practices encompassed in a broader term referred to as climate smart 
agriculture (CSA). Use of SAIPs like SWC are part of the practices used to mitigate crop losses during 
dry spells as a consequence of the changing climate. Crop intercropping, a key sustainable 
intensification practice used to manage soil fertility as well as moisture preservation  (for example 
maize-legume and banana-coffee intercrop regimes), has been shown to be an effective CSA 
mechanism in controlling pests and diseases whose increased incidence is attributed to rising 
temperatures (Campbell et al. 2014). Also, conservation agriculture through use of zero/minimum 
tillage and herbicides to control weeds is an important SAIP practice which prevents soil compacting 
leading to soil degradation. The practice is also an important CSA strategy for soil moisture 
conservation in instances of dry spells.  
Perhaps the most important linkage between climate change adaptation and sustainable agricultural 
intensification in the context of this thesis, other than the mentioned soil fertility management, is that 
of use of improved seeds and farm diversification. While improved seeds use is a standard 
intensification practice used since the advent of the green revolution, the meaning of the term is now 
changing as environmental risks intensify. Improved seeds for a long time has referred to hybrid seeds 
i.e. seeds that do extremely well in situations where the weather is good, but perform poorly generally 
in situations of low rainfall. They are also non-recyclable and farmers are advised to plant them only 
once for optimal yields. In the context of risk management given the changing climate, improved 
seeds are now being bred to withstand climate stressors and for sustainability. Thus “improved seeds” 
as a sustainable agricultural intensification practice is now a conventional climate change adaptation 
strategy where the term may refer to seeds that are drought tolerant, water tolerant or early maturing 
to mitigate against early stop of rains.  
On the other hand, incorporating livestock farming with crop farming to exploit synergies in the two 
farm enterprises, is a key sustainable intensification practice; animals provide manure for the 
improvement of soil fertility and traction power for ploughing farming areas, while crops provide 




diversification in farming enterprises create resilience to climatic shocks, as well as providing 
households with a diversified nutritional base. 
Broadly, the interdependence between climate change and land (soil) degradation is uncontested; land 
degradation allows the escape of carbon dioxide trapped in soils to the atmosphere, accumulation of 
which contributes to global warming. The UNCCD (2007), for instance, estimates that achieving land 
degradation neutrality (LDN) by restoring and rehabilitating 12 million hectares of degraded land per 
year could help close carbon dioxide gas emissions gap by up to 25% in the year 2030. On the other 
hand, another interdependence closer to one of the subjects of this thesis regards soil degradation and 
carbon. Soil carbon has been shown to be essential in helping plants absorb nutrients with evidence 
showing that degraded soils low on carbon have a diminished ability to take up nutrients, including 
those in applied inorganic fertilizers like nitrogen (Kihara et al., 2016; Marenya and Barrett, 2009; 
Zingore, 2011).  
Consequently, practices that limit the escape of soil carbon to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide yield 
double dividends i.e. that of helping soils remain fertile, while at the same time mitigating global 
warming. At the same time, practices that help produce more food intensively prevent the opening up 
of more land to feed growing populations, a practice shown to contribute to global warming through 
release of carbon to the atmosphere. This underscores the broad complementarity between climate 
change adaptation and sustainable agricultural intensification. Indeed, Climate Smart Agriculture 
(CSA) provides the foundations for incentivizing and enabling sustainable agricultural intensification 
through its emphasis on risk management, information flows and local institutions to support adaptive 
capacity (Campbell et al. 2014).  
1.2 Thesis contribution  
The interlinkages between climate change adaptation and sustainable agricultural intensification 
motivate the focus of this thesis. Despite the myriad of challenges facing smallholder agricultural 
production in SSA, uptake of technology that intensifies production sustainably and creates resilience 
in production is still quite low. This is not unique to climate change adaptation and sustainable 
intensification though, as the paradox of low adoption of agricultural technologies and interventions 
has preoccupied most development economics literature in the past. Barriers to technology uptake 
identified in the literature span across institutional factors like missing credit markets; socio-economic 




like risk/uncertainty aversion; and poor/inadequate policy response. However, the literature is still 
nascent on the adoption of technology that addresses the emerging threats of climate change and soil 
degradation, as well as action areas where intervention could lead to adequate management of risks 
posed by these threats to livelihoods. Essays in this dissertation add to this growing literature by 
assessing the barriers and enablers to climate change adaptation and sustainable agricultural 
intensification in smallholder farms. 
In the climate change adaptation literature, climate information has been cited as a key success factor 
towards enhancing adaptation (Singh et al. 2017; Di Falco, Veronesi, and Yesuf 2011; Mulwa et al., 
2017). Farmers with limited access to precise weather forecasts may not be able to adequately prepare 
for adverse weather in a season. Information on the available appropriate responses to specific 
projected climate outcomes may also be key to enabling adaptation. This hypothesis is tested in the 
first essay of the thesis. The role played by provision of weather information in enhancing take up of 
farming technology is assessed using a framed experiment approach where farmers choose farming 
technologies with and without information on weather outcomes within the season and the difference 
in the payoffs of these choices are compared.  
The foregoing discussion show farm diversification as an important sustainable agricultural practice 
and climate change adaptation strategy. Diversification in farm enterprises and labour has been shown 
to be an effective way of adapting to climate change. Extant literature explores various aspects of 
diversification including livestock, crop and off-farm diversification (Megersa et al., 2014; 
Tibesigwa, Visser and Turpie, 2015; Barrett et al., 2017; Asfaw, Pallante and Palma, 2018). The 
second essay in this thesis looks at whether farm diversification can be leveraged for food security in 
semi-arid areas like northern Namibia. The essay focuses on both crop and livestock diversification 
in a household, which is a novel approach unexplored in existing literature. Given the precarious 
nature of livelihoods in semi-arid areas like northern Namibia and the ongoing government efforts to 
combat climate change, the essay’s policy implications are topical.  
As the section on overview above shows, soil degradation is a serious issue in SSA and soil 
management practices are critical for the improvement of soil fertility and productivity. The third 
essay in this thesis interrogates this issue and explores to what extent the marketing value chain, 
specifically large grain traders involvement in smallholder grain markets, can be leveraged to drive 




unlocking other policy intervention avenues for the enhancement of technology uptake in smallholder 
farming households. Sustainable agricultural practices explored in the essay are inorganic and organic 
fertilizer, and improved seed use.  
To achieve all this, the essays utilize relatively new econometric methodologies in these type of 
studies, for example, the dynamic probit model, the two stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method and 
the panel data double hurdle model. Both panel data and cross-sectional datasets are used as well as 
experimental data collected using a framed experiment. The essays also cover regions where few such 
studies have been carried out i.e. northern Namibia. 
1.3 Thesis Objectives 
The broad objectives forming essays within the thesis are enumerated below, with sub-objectives 
explored within each broad objective also shown;  
1. To evaluate the effect of farm diversification on food security among smallholder 
farmers in northern Namibia 
1.1 Assess the joint determinants to crop and livestock diversification  
1.2 Evaluate the effect of crop, livestock and overall diversification on food security outcomes 
1.3 Evaluate how different levels of combined diversification in crop and livestock enterprises 
affect food security outcomes 
2. To assess the role of large grain traders in incentivizing the adoption of sustainable 
agricultural intensification practices  in Kenya 
2.1 Assess the determinants to large grain sales among farming households  
2.2 Assess the determinants to adoption of fertilizer, improved seeds and manure 
2.3 Evaluate the dynamic effect in the adoption of SAIPS 
3. To assess how provision of weather information affects choice of farming technology in 
a farming season in northern Namibia 
3.1 Assess the role of weather uncertainty in dampening technology uptake 
3.2 Assess the demand for weather information under different levels of weather uncertainty  





1.4 Choice of study areas  
Two of the chapters in this study are from data collected in northern Namibia while the third is from 
longitudinal data from Kenya. Semi-arid areas in developing countries have been predicted to be 
affected the most in terms of agricultural losses due to climate change. The UNDP (2015) puts 
Namibia as the seventh most at-risk country in terms of climate change related agricultural losses. 
Given the fragile livelihoods therein, urgent measures are imminent to raise the adaptive capacity of 
the people and production systems in such countries. To support policy, studies on barriers and 
success factors for climate change adaptation are crucial for such regions, and so is documenting 
evidence of the impact of such measures on people’s welfare.  
Further, there is a dearth of empirical studies on rural household livelihoods and welfare from 
Namibia. The low literature citation for studies from the country in this dissertation points to that fact. 
This is despite planned adaptation programs happening in the country through government plans on 
climate change for example the National Climate Policy for Namibia-2011 (GRN 2011). Studies in 
this dissertation can result in policy recommendations relevant for the country, which was a big 
motivation for the choice of Namibia as a study country, focusing on climate change adaptation. The 
northern part of the country was chosen because it is the largely populated region and also where 
smallholder farming, both crop and livestock, is the main source of livelihood. Data from a study 
carried out in the region under the Adaptation at Scale in Semi-Arid Regions (ASSAR) project has 
been used in the first and second essays of this thesis. 
In Kenya, rising rural population and scarcity of land has led to declining land productivity due to 
soil degradation (Muyanga, Jayne, and Burke 2013). Farmers are farming increasingly small portions 
of land with some areas like the Central and Kisii highlands leading in unsustainably intensely 
cultivated lands. Given the low input use in the region, continuous soil mining without replenishment 
has in some cases resulted to severe soil degradation contributing to low productivity. Some studies 
have attributed the low demand for fertilizer to low yield-response of crops to fertilizer use, since the 
soils are so depleted of organic matter that their capacity to take up nitrogen is very low (Kihara et al. 
2016; Marenya and Barrett 2009). The region is in dire need of sustainable intensification for soil 
fertility restoration and rural poverty alleviation. This motivates the choice of the country to study the 




In addition, one of the hypothesis being tested in the thesis is whether large grain traders can be used 
to incentivize the adoption of SAIPs at the farm level. While such market actors have been unobserved 
in rural grain markets, recent evidence show the emergence of these in Kenya and Zambia (Sitko et 
al. 2017). Kenya’s unique advantage for choice as a study area on this aspect lies in the presence of a 
large panel dataset on rural livelihoods spanning over a decade. The study has been carried out 
through a long-term collaboration between Egerton University’s Tegemeo institute, an agricultural 
policy think tank in Kenya, and Michigan State University’s department of Agricultural, Food, and 
Resource Economics in the United States. The data from this project called TAMPA (Tegemeo 
Agricultural Monitoring and Policy Analysis) has been utilized for the third essay in this thesis. 
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2 Farm diversification and climate change: Implications for Food Security 
in Northern Namibia 
Abstract 
Limited non-farm opportunities in the rural areas of the developing world, coupled with population 
growth, means agriculture will continue to play a dominant role as a source of livelihood in these 
areas. Thus, while rural transformation has dominated recent literature as a way of improving 
welfare through diversifying into non-farm sectors, improving productivity and resilience to 
shocks in smallholder agricultural production cannot be downplayed. This is especially so given 
the changing climatic conditions affecting agricultural production, and thus threatening many 
livelihoods in rural areas. Farm diversification is an important strategy for creating resilience 
against climatic shocks in farm production. Using cross-sectional data from northern Namibia, the 
study assesses the barriers and success factors related to effective crop and livestock enterprises 
diversification and the effect of these on food security outcomes. A Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression model is used to assess the joint factors explaining total farm diversification, while a 
step-wise error correction model is used to evaluate the conditional effect of diversification in each 
of the two farm enterprises on two measures of food security: food expenditure and dietary 
diversity. We find that past exposure to climate shocks informs current diversification levels and 
that access to climate information is a key success factor for both livestock and crop diversification. 
In terms of food security, greater diversification in either crop or livestock production leads to 
higher food security outcomes, with neither crop nor livestock diversification showing dominance 
in affecting food security outcomes. However, an overall higher level of diversification in both 
livestock and crop enterprises is dominant in explaining food security outcomes.  
2.1 Introduction 
Risk is inherent in small-scale rain-fed agricultural production. Farmers have to contend with 
seasonal weather uncertainties, the threat of pests and diseases, and post-harvest losses, among 
other risks. These risks are being exacerbated by the effects of a changing climate; for example, 
the severity and distribution of important livestock and crop diseases is changing, while incidents 




Manabe, 2002). These effects of climate change are expected to increase poverty incidences in 
most developing countries and create new poverty pockets in countries with increasing inequality 
(IPCC, 2014). 
Agricultural production has been stagnant in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and there is consensus 
that the current trend in productivity cannot guarantee food security in the region (Kyalo Willy et 
al., 2019; Onyutha, 2018). Climatic shocks that further adversely affect food production are a 
serious threat to food security and livelihoods in the region. While there are adaptation options that 
can create resilience in agricultural productivity, studies continue to show low adoption rates 
across the region (Bradshaw et al., 2004; Di Falco et al., 2011; Mulwa et al., 2017; Singh et al., 
2017; Smit and Wandel, 2006). In crop farming, such adaptation measures include using seeds 
adapted to climate-stressors (for example drought resistant seeds) and spreading risks across 
different crop types (Howden et al. 2007). In livestock farming, farmers can also choose to adopt 
livestock breeds  that are tolerant to climate-stressors, as well as diversify into different livestock 
types/species (Rojas-Downing et al., 2017).   
Recent literature on diversification focuses on rural transformations from predominantly 
agriculture-related sectors to rural non-farm sectors (see for example Barrett et al., 2017). While 
this is important in reducing the prevalent disguised unemployment in peasant agriculture, such 
non-farm opportunities remain largely non-existent in rural areas of SSA. With the recent 
phenomena of climate change effects threatening to depress agricultural productivity further and 
jeopardize livelihoods for many in these regions, evaluating strategies for creating resilience in the 
sector cannot be overlooked (Bradshaw et al., 2004). This study aims to evaluate households’ farm 
diversification as an adaptation strategy to climatic shocks, and the on effect food security.  
Most studies assessing farm diversification focus on either crop or livestock diversification 
(Adjimoti and Kwadzo, 2018; Makate et al., 2016; Mango et al., 2018; Megersa et al., 2014; Rojas-
Downing et al., 2017; Tittonell, 2014). Others extending to both farm and non-farm diversification 
treat farm diversification as one activity that encompasses crop and livestock farming (Berhanu et 
al., 2007; Martin and Lorenzen, 2016). An exception is Tibesigwa et al. (2015) that compared 
outcomes of farmers who are specialized in either of the enterprises with those of farmers who 
practice mixed farming. Considering livestock and crop diversification separately may 




each diversification type. Similarly, comparing specialized systems with mixed ones hides 
information on how the extent of diversification in each enterprise affects welfare. Furthermore, it 
is difficult to encounter specialized systems among smallholder farmers, who more often practice 
a mix of crop and livestock activities (as exemplified in northern Namibia).  
Our study adds to this literature by assessing the joint determinants of diversification in both 
livestock and crop farming, and how the extent of diversification in each activity contributes to 
food security. Further, in a novel attempt to assess which enterprise diversification contributes 
most to food security, the study compares food security outcomes for households with varying 
levels of crop and livestock diversification. 
2.2 Climate change and farm diversification 
Diversification literature identifies factors that “push” farmers to diversify as a hedge against risks, 
and factors that “pull” farmers to diversify in order to take advantage of other opportunities. In 
farm diversification, an example of a push factor may be the increasing climate shocks that make 
it risky to rely on a certain crop (e.g. maize) or livestock type (e.g. cattle) as the only enterprise, 
necessitating the adoption of a mix of crop and livestock types that may be more resilient to climate 
shocks. A “pull” factor on the other hand may be the advantage of planting crop mixes that are 
symbiotic, e.g., planting runner beans that use maize stalks as support, while fixing nitrogen 
fertilizer for the maize crop.  
Climate change affects livestock production through impacts on pasture and water, as well as 
through diseases associated with climate shocks (Rojas-Downing et al., 2017). Choosing the 
optimal count of livestock and livestock types to keep is key to mitigating these impacts. Declining 
pastures and water availability may call for substitution of resource-demanding species like cattle 
for the more resilient small ruminants like goats and sheep (Gautam and Andersen, 2016). In 
Namibia, the importance of mixing  small ruminants with cattle rearing is more pronounced; while 
cattle ownership is a symbol of prestige and the animals are used for festivities like weddings, 
funerals and bride price (Musemwa et al. 2008), the small ruminants are important for providing 
nutrients and dietary diversity, either through direct consumption or sale. In Ethiopia, Megersa et 
al., (2014) found that households that were more diversified in livestock production had higher 
average off-take in livestock sales, had fewer months of food insecurity, and scored higher on 




Crop diversification involves the use of different seed varieties of the same crop type, as well as 
planting of different crop types in a farming season. Agricultural intensification inputs like hybrid 
seeds have been the core of agricultural transformation since the green revolution. Within the 
context of a changing climate, improved seeds have to be not just output enhancing but also 
resilient to shocks like droughts and pests (Lin 2011; Mulwa et al., 2017). Incorporating these 
types of seeds in a mix of crops and varieties planted can be an important adaptation strategy for 
resilience. Other benefits of diversified cropping systems include improving soil fertility and 
expanding household’s dietary diversity for improved nutrition uptake.  
Studies show that at the subsistence level, diversification into both crop and livestock production 
is complementary (Berhanu et al., 2007; Megersa et al., 2014). Farmers can use crop residues as 
livestock feed while animals provide draught power and manure (Megersa et al. 2014). This 
relationship may however have a threshold level above which competition for scarce resources 
leads to one crowding out the other. For example, with scarce labor, households may only practice 
crop farming, which has a higher marginal return to labour, while those with higher labour supply 
may be able to diversify into livestock (Berhanu, Colman, and Fayissa 2007). 
The success factors for diversification as identified in the literature include social capital, asset 
ownership, government/NGO transfer programs, remittances and off-farm opportunities (Barrett 
et al., 2001; Davis et al., 2010; Wuepper et al., 2018). Investigating the importance of each of these 
for diversification in the study region is important for policy. The dearth of literature on 
agricultural production and food security in the study region further shows the importance of this 
study. 
2.3 Study Area 
This study was conducted in three regions in northern Namibia: Omusati, Oshana and Oshakati. 
Climate in the region is semi-arid and rainfall is seasonal and highly variable both in quantity and 
timing. A changing climate has resulted in shorter rain seasons characterised by high temperatures, 
late onset of rains and higher incidences of droughts (Repulic of Namibia, 2011). This has 
exacerbated vulnerability of livelihoods in the region which are highly dependent on natural 
resources and comprise mostly rain-fed subsistence agriculture. There is low adaptive capacity in 
the region and Namibia is considered to be among the highly vulnerable African countries with 




Land use in the region is characterised by combining livestock herding and small-scale cereal 
production, supplemented by timber and non-timber resources like wild fruits and mopane worms 
(Newsham and Thomas, 2009). A significant proportion of households (25%) participate in off-
farm income ventures, while 23% participate in government transfer programs. This number is 
relatively small, though, compared to those who rely on farming and forest products (timber and 
non-timber) for livelihoods (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 2-1: Livelihood activities practiced 
Crop cultivation remains the most practiced livelihood activity in the region while a high 
proportion also rear livestock (cattle and small ruminants).   
2.4 Sampling and data 
Data for this study come from the Adaptation at Scale in Semi-Arid Regions (ASSAR) project. A 
multistage random sampling procedure was used to select 650 households from three regions in 
northern Namibia. First, the three regions (Oshana, Omusati and Oshikoto) were purposively 
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Table 2-1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Variable description Mean  Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables 
Improved seed Household has adopted drought tolerant/early maturing millet 
varieties (1=yes; 0=no) 
0.18 - 
Crop diversification Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) for crop diversification 0.58 0.24 
Livestock diversification Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) for livestock 
diversification 
0.63 0.24 
Food expenditure Per capita food  expenditure (N$)  112.5 141.9 
Dietary diversity  Household Dietary diversity score 6.92 1.98 
Explanatory variables 
Climate shocks-crop Past exposure to climate shocks with severe effect on cropping 
(1=yes; 0=no)  
0.48 - 
Climate shocks-livestock Past exposure to climate shocks with severe effect on 
livestock (1=yes; 0=no)  
0.35 - 
Age Age of household head 61.57 17.03 
Education Education of household head (years of schooling) 5.66 4.05 
Gender Gender of household head (1=male; 0=female) 0.43 - 
Household size Total household size (number) 5.63 3.06 
Asset index Assets owned (pca1 factors) 1.62e-08 1.00 
Social capital Factors of relatives and friends one can go to for help in and 




Information access-crop If household received climate information specific to crop 




If household received climate information specific to livestock 
management (1=yes; 0=no) 
0.45 - 
Credit access If household received crop/livestock input credit (1=yes; 
0=no) 
0.20 - 
Formal employment If household had access to formal employment opportunities 
(1=yes; 0=no) 
0.25 - 
Government transfers If household received safety nets from the government (1=yes; 
0=no) 
0.23 - 
Remittances If household had access to remittance income  (1=yes; 0=no) 0.33 - 
Location characteristics 
Omusati (ref. region) Omusati region (1=yes; 0=no) 43.93 - 
Oshana Oshana region (1=yes; 0=no) 29.19 - 
Oshikoto Oshikoto region (1=yes; 0=no) 26.88 - 
Two constituencies were each selected from Oshana and Oshikoto and three from Omusati to 
capture the diversity within the regions. Random proportionate to size sampling was then used to 
select villages and households to include in the survey. Data was collected by a team of trained 




2.5 Construction and description of variables 
2.5.1 Farm enterprise diversification indices 
Different types of indices have been used in the literature to measure livelihood diversification 
(Davis et al., 2010; Lay et al., Mahmoud, and M’Mukaria, 2008; Wuepper et al., 2018). Our study 
aimed to investigate not only the number of farming activities a household is engaged in, but also 
the intensity of engagement in each. To this end, we chose the Herfindahl–Hirschman index 
(hereafter HHI) which is mostly used in finance to measure market concentration, and has been 
applied previously in studies similar to ours (see Chen et al., 2018; Wuepper et al., 2018).  
Information on crops and seed types grown by a household and area allocated to each was  used 
to construct the crop diversification index, while the livestock diversification index was 
constructed using information on livestock types and numbers kept by a household. Following 






where 𝐻𝐻𝐼 is the index for household k for j diversification (crop/livestock), ES is the enterprise 
share (i.e. area share for crop i or Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) share for livestock type i) and n 
is the number of crops cultivated/livestock types kept per household.  
 
Figure 2-2: Farm enterprise diversification indices 
A highly diversified household has an HHI close to 0, while a fully specialized one has an HHI of 


























spike around 1, indicating a high proportion with complete specialization in either of the two 
enterprises (Figure 2).  
2.5.2 Exposure to climatic shocks 
To establish people’s exposure to climatic shocks, some studies use respondents’ perceptions on 
long term changes in climate variables like rainfall and temperature (for example Megersa et al., 
2014), while others use geo-referenced climate information (for example Asfaw et al., 2018). The 
former is more subjective and may be confounded by a number of factors, for example the 
respondent’s existing knowledge about climate change. With the latter, the covariate nature of 
climate shocks implies that households in similar geographic locations will experience similar 
climatic events, hence limiting heterogeneity in the climatic shocks exposure variable.  
To establish exposure to climatic shocks, our study utilizes information collected from the survey 
regarding whether a household was exposed to climatic shocks in the past. To construct the 
variable, incidences of exposure were restricted to those occurring three or more years prior to the 
survey year, such that  the variable would be correlated with current diversification strategies as 
hypothesized to be, but not current food security outcomes. This allows for the validity of the 
variable as an instrument in estimating effect of diversification on food security, as discussed later 
under the section on the estimation strategy. 
2.5.3 Access to climate information 
Access to climate information has been shown to affect climate change adaptation, including farm 
diversification decisions (Mulwa et al., 2017; Chen 2018). The study uses data on whether 
households received climate-related information for both livestock and crop management to 
construct a climate information access variable for inclusion in the analysis. About 52% and 45% 
of the respondents received climate-related information on crop and livestock management, 
respectively. Climate information received centred on strategies that farmers could use to mitigate 
the effects of climatic shocks including farm enterprise diversification, adoption of resilient seeds 
and crops and/or livestock, etc.  
While access to climate information is hypothesized to directly affect decisions to diversify farm 
enterprises, it is unreasonable to assume a direct effect on food security outcomes. Adoption of 
strategies that dampen the adverse effects of climatic shocks, as a result of a farmer being a 




outcomes given occurrence of climatic shocks. Thus access to climate information is used as 
selection instrument, in the analysis of the effect of farm diversification on food security, within 
the context of a changing climate.  
2.5.4 Food security measures 
The study uses household food per capita expenditure and household dietary diversity score 
(HDDS) as indicators of food security. Household food expenditure measures the food access 
dimension of food security since it captures other sources of food besides own production, while 
HDDS measures the food utilization dimension. The use of the two indicators in this study ensures 
a comprehensive measure of food security while also acting as a check on the robustness on the 
results.   
2.5.5 Socio-economic variables  
Access to capital and income is an important prerequisite in the adoption of relatively expensive 
technology. We hypothesize a positive correlation between level of diversification and variables 
like access to off-farm income,, remittances, government safety nets and physical assets. These 
variables are also included in the outcome equation to control for their effect on food security 
outcomes, given the level of diversification.  For the asset ownership and social capital variables 
included in the analysis, principal component analysis was used to construct the former and factor 
analysis for the latter, following Wuepper et al. (2018). Other usual household demographic 
variables included in the analysis include household head’s age, gender and education level, and 
the size of the household in adult equivalence. 
2.6 Estimation strategy and model specification 
2.6.1 Estimation strategy 
The analytical framework presents some challenges. First, the decisions to diversify in both crop 
and livestock enterprises are interdependent; diversifying into different livestock types can be 
informed by the crop types a household farms, and vice versa. We also hypothesize that the two 
decisions are jointly determined by similar factors.  Secondly, crop and livestock farming 
simultaneously affect food security either as complements or substitutes when practiced together. 
Analysing the effect of one without considering the other might over- or under- estimate their 
contribution to the food security status of a household.  Similarly, different levels of diversification 




Our analysis involves two decision equations with continuous dependent variables (indices with 
an upper limit censored at 1). The seemingly unrelated regression (SUREG) model has been used 
in similar studies to estimate equations with continuous dependent variables and correlated error 
terms (Kassie et al., 2017; Wilde et al., 1999). However, given that the dependent variables are 
continuous only up to an upper limit censoring, each of the two equations are re-estimated using a 
Tobit model and the results compared with those from the SUREG model. 
In impact evaluation, the major challenge of attributing impact using observational data is 
establishing a true counterfactual free of bias. Observed and unobserved heterogeneity among the 
treatment and control groups may confound the effect of treatment, leading to wrong 
interpretations and policy recommendations. When observations are observed repeatedly over time 
intervals, panel data methods can easily be applied to control for unobserved heterogeneity, while 
conventional methods are used to control for the observed heterogeneity (for example observing 
the before and after treatment scenarios). This is not so straightforward for cross-sectional studies 
as in this study.  
Based on the preceding discussion, our main challenge in impact estimation emanates from the 
non-random process of assigning treatment. Farmers in our sample may have self-selected into 
different levels of crop and livestock diversification, based on observable (e.g. income, extension 
access, etc.) and unobservable (e.g. personal ambition, managerial ability, etc.) conditions. For a 
genuine claim to the effect of diversification, we need to correct for this non-randomness in the 
diversification decisions. Existing methods that correct for this endogeneity either use instrumental 
variables or matching techniques like propensity score matching. In our case, the instrumental 
variable approach would require an instrument that is correlated with diversification decisions, but 
not directly correlated with food security outcomes.  
Given the continuous nature of our treatments (indices of crop and livestock diversification), we 
rule out step-wise correction methods that assume the treatment is binary or categorical. 
Generalized Propensity Score (GPS) method could be used to estimate dose-response functions 
(for example Kassie et al., 2014) in this case on the effect of extent of farm diversification on stated 
food security outcomes. However, our study has two treatment variables (crop and livestock 
diversification indices) and estimation of the combined effect of multiple treatment variables using 




studies (Asfaw et al., 2018; Kassie et al., 2015), we adopt the control function approach, also called 
the two stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method (Terza, Basu, and Rathouz, 2008), to correct for 
endogeneity and estimate the true effect of crop and livestock diversification on household food 
security outcomes.  
To achieve this, we first estimate joint determinants of crop and livestock diversification using the 
SUREG model, and obtain the crop and livestock diversification residuals. We then plug these into 
a second stage Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of the effect of diversification on food 
security, controlling for other observable covariates. The instruments used in the first stage and 
excluded in the second stage are access to livestock/crop management information and past 
exposure to climatic shocks. As stated earlier, for these variables to meet the exclusion restrictions 
and hence be valid instruments, they must be correlated with the diversification decisions but not 
food security outcomes, i.e., they should affect food security outcomes only through their effect 
on diversification decisions. It’s intuitive to see how access to information meets this criterion. For 
the climatic shock exposure variable, the restriction of these shocks to those that occurred more 
than two years ago makes it unlikely that they are directly correlated with current food security 
outcomes, while being correlated with current diversification decisions. Including household 
income and asset ownership in the outcome equation also controls for the possible long term effects 
of past exposure to climate shocks, given the literature on climatic shocks and poverty traps among 
vulnerable households (Leichenko and Silva, 2014).  
2.6.2 Empirical model 
The SUREG model is specified as: 
                    𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 + Ф𝑖𝑿 + 𝑖                               (1) 
where  𝐻𝐻𝐼 is the Herfindahl–Hirschman index for enterprise 𝑖 (i=crop/livestock); climshock is 
the variable for climate shocks on enterprise 𝑖; 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 is the variable for climate information 
on enterprise 𝑖 management; 𝑿 is a vector of all other explanatory variables that are similar in both 
equations; 𝑖 are the error terms for the two equations and 𝐶𝑂𝑉( 1, 2) ≠ 0 (i.e., error terms for 
equations 1 and 2 are correlated). 
The two equations do not need to have exactly the same set of explanatory variables (Cappellari 
and Jenkins, 2010). We thus include the indicator variable for climate information specific to crop 




livestock management on the livestock diversification equation. Climate shocks usually affect both 
crop and livestock enterprises within a farm, where shocks in one enterprise (e.g. livestock) may 
reinforce diversification in the other (e.g. crop) as a resilience-boosting strategy. To capture these 
dynamics, we include both shocks to crop and livestock enterprises in each of the diversification 
equations, including an interaction term between the two shocks.  The two equations are balanced 
in the number of observations and are therefore estimated using the normal SUREG STATA 
command, without any loss in efficiency (McDowell 2004). 
In the step-wise error correction procedure and following Wooldridge (2002), we predict the 
residuals from equations 1 for both livestock and crop diversification, then include them in the 
regression equation below:    
                          𝐹𝑆𝑗 = 𝜎𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐 + 𝜋𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑙 +  𝜃𝑖𝑿𝑖 + 𝜆𝑐 + 𝜆𝑙 + 𝜇𝑖                                                     (2) 
where FS is food security measure j (j=per capita food expenditure/household dietary diversity 
score), 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐 and 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑙 are the crop and livestock diversification indices, respectively; 𝑿 is the 
vector of variables from equation 1; 𝜆𝑐 and 𝜆𝑙 are the residuals (self-selection correction terms) 
for crop and livestock diversification obtained from equation 1; and 𝜇 is the error term. 
2.7 Results and Discussion 
In this section, key results from the study are discussed. The section begins with describing results 
on the factors affecting diversification decisions, followed by results from the empirical model, 
and a non-parametric analysis of the effect of diversification on food security. The non-parametric 
analysis compares different combinations of crop and livestock diversification levels to understand 
how combining the two enterprises at different levels of diversification affects food security.  
2.7.1 Determinants of diversification  
The results from table 2 (columns 3 and 4) show that key drivers of adaptation are: past exposure 
to climatic shocks, access to information and credit, wealth (asset index and formal employment) 





Table 2-2 Determinants of climate change adaptation strategies  









 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Climate shocks-crops 0.0173 0.0520* 0.00726 0.0338 
 (0.0266) (0.0273) (0.0244) (0.0227) 
Climate shocks-livestock 0.000868 -0.0690** 0.00604 -0.0623** 
 (0.0354) (0.0349) (0.0317) (0.0296) 
Climate shock-crops #  -0.120*** -0.0163 -0.102** 0.00195 
climate shocks-livestock (0.0460) (0.0458) (0.0415) (0.0387) 
Information access -0.0895*** -0.0368* -0.0748*** -0.0293 
 (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0195) (0.0181) 
HH head age -0.000778 -7.79e-05 -0.000576 -8.90e-05 
 (0.000748) (0.000753) (0.000675) (0.000629) 
HH head education   -0.00396 -0.00307 -0.00354 -0.00260 
 (0.00317) (0.00317) (0.00285) (0.00266) 
HH head gender   -0.0185 -0.0591*** -0.00637 -0.0516*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0190) (0.0177) 
HH size -0.00508 -0.0187*** -0.00390 -0.0154*** 
 (0.00352) (0.00357) (0.00322) (0.00301) 
Formal employment 0.0251 -0.0396 0.0256 -0.0333 
 (0.0242) (0.0240) (0.0218) (0.0203) 
Asset index 0.00611 -0.0614*** 0.00670 -0.0527*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0102) (0.00951) 
Social capital 0.0104 -0.0297* 0.00621 -0.0231* 
 (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0142) (0.0132) 
Credit access 0.106*** - 0.0898*** - 
 (0.0265)  (0.0239)  
Government transfers 0.0239 -0.0185 0.0236 -0.0137 
 (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0225) (0.0209) 
Remittances 0.0198 -0.0295 0.0208 -0.0196 
 (0.0222) (0.0225) (0.0203) (0.0189) 
Oshana region 0.0225 0.0877*** 0.0231 0.0751*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0272) (0.0245) (0.0228) 
Oshikoto region 0.0599** 0.119*** 0.0498** 0.0981*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0254) (0.0228) (0.0213) 
     
N 639 639 639 639 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Consistent with other studies (Megersa et al., 2014; Rojas-Downing et al., 2017; Wuepper et al., 
2018), we find that past exposure to climate shocks significantly affects both crop and livestock 




were found to have diversified more in both enterprises. The crop diversification variable includes 
area share allocated to drought tolerant millet varieties and traditional ones, in addition to other 
crops like legumes and nuts. As such, shocks experienced in the past could drive households to 
hedge against future exposure by diversifying their crop and/or variety mix. Likewise, past 
exposure to livestock shocks also discourages specialization in one livestock type, perhaps as a 
hedge against diseases and pests occasioned by climate shocks or livestock deaths due to dwindling 
resources like pasture and water. 
Similar to other study findings (Chen et al., 2018; Mulwa et al., 2017; Shiferaw et al., 2014), 
availability of climate information was found to play a significant role in explaining both crop and 
livestock diversification. There is a negative correlation between diversification indices and 
information access, implying that access to information led to higher diversification (index tends 
to zero).     
In terms of demographics, higher educated household heads diversify more in crop farming, while 
male-headed households are more diversified in livestock keeping. It’s established in the literature 
that males tend to keep big ruminants like cattle, while women tend to keep small ruminants and 
poultry (Ellis, 1998; Gautam and Andersen, 2016). Male-headed households also tend to have both 
spouses present, and thus more likely to own a diversified portfolio of livestock assets. On the 
other hand, households that had heads who were formally employed were found to have diversified 
more in livestock keeping. This could indicate the importance of livestock as sources of prestige, 
and the ability to purchase these with access to employment wages. This is confirmed by the 
positive correlation between asset ownership and livestock diversification. 
Consistent with other studies (e.g. Wuepper et al. 2018), the social capital variable is positively 
and significantly correlated with livestock diversification. Given the information used to construct 
this variable i.e. number of relatives and non-relatives a household has, and can rely on, in times 
of need for financial help, this could be viewed as a source of informal credit for acquisition of 
culturally important livestock assets. Some projects in the region also enhance livestock ownership 
by giving seed cattle to a community, which are then distributed to households within the 
community as the cattle multiply (Musemwa et al. 2008). Social capital within the community is 




crop farming is found to decrease crop diversification, perhaps due to the specificity of dispensed 
inputs (e.g. improved millet seeds) as credit in kind.  
2.7.2 Effect of diversification on food security 
Empirical model results 
We estimated the effect of diversification on monthly per capita food expenditure and household 
dietary diversity score (HDDS), conditional on other covariates controlled for in the analysis. This 
second stage of the 2SRI estimations followed either a Tobit or SUREG estimation of the 
determinants of crop and/or livestock diversification in the first stage (see Table 2). Columns 1-2 
and 3-4 present estimations of the effect of crop and livestock diversification, respectively, on food 
security, following Tobit estimations in the first stage. Columns 5-6, on the other hand, are 
estimations of the effect of both livestock and crop diversification, among other control variables, 
on food security following SUREG estimation in the first stage. In this section, we report results 
from the latter estimation (columns 5-6).  
The results show that both crop and livestock diversification have significant effects on food 
security outcomes; crop diversification significantly affects both per capita food expenditure and 
HDDS while livestock diversification affects only HDDS. Specifically, a unit increase in crop 
diversification increases household monthly per capita expenditure by about N$78 and HDDS by 
about 0.7 points. A unit increase in livestock diversification on the other hand increases HDDS by 
about 0.8 points. The results point to an income effect of crop production where greater 
diversification leads to higher incomes, hence ability to spend more on food, perhaps due to using 
resilient crops and seed varieties. Livestock in northern Namibia is mostly kept for household 
consumption and festivities, which could explain why diversifying in this enterprise leads to a 





Table 2-3 Determinants of food security 
 Crop divers. equations Livestock divers. equations Combined 

















 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Crop diversification  -55.93*** -0.714** - - -77.62*** -0.666* 
index (20.19) (0.350)   (19.61) (0.339) 
Livestock  - - 3.852 -0.884** 0.682 -0.836** 
diversification index   (29.95) (0.381) (29.73) (0.367) 
HH head age 1.024** 0.0142** 1.456*** 0.0148** 1.437*** 0.0136** 
 (0.516) (0.00577) (0.521) (0.00586) (0.527) (0.00568) 
HH head  education   9.583*** 0.135*** 11.01*** 0.117*** 10.71*** 0.106*** 
 (2.307) (0.0253) (2.352) (0.0279) (2.391) (0.0267) 
HH head gender  13.00 0.0142** 43.16*** 0.0104 50.27*** 0.0155 
 (11.69) (0.00577) (11.99) (0.217) (11.92) (0.222) 
HH size - -0.00107  -0.0877* - -0.0837 
  (0.0255)  (0.0522)  (0.0518) 
Asset index -2.837 0.173** 33.68*** -0.170 41.83*** -0.157 
 (6.464) (0.0852) (7.656) (0.184) (8.861) (0.195) 
Social capital index 3.460 0.147 15.55*** -0.0922 18.13*** -0.0780 
 (8.156) (0.112) (5.747) (0.128) (6.142) (0.126) 
Formal employment 27.37** 0.932*** 56.72*** 0.639*** 64.47*** 0.613*** 
 (13.28) (0.188) (13.58) (0.217) (13.87) (0.218) 
Government transfer -36.57*** -0.182 -10.64 -0.387** -4.893 -0.335* 
 (10.50) (0.183) (9.827) (0.182) (11.13) (0.184) 
Remittances  -12.58 0.371** 3.771 0.194 5.795 0.245 
 (11.97) (0.168) (11.43) (0.179) (12.04) (0.173) 
Error correction  -209.8*** 1.263 - - 43.39 0.291 
term- crop   (75.51) (1.314)   (98.63) (1.533) 
Error correction  - - -486.5*** 4.204* -709.9*** 4.584 
term- livestock     (81.02) (2.359) (115.7) (3.064) 
Oshana region -14.81 -0.320 -44.50*** 0.0467 -49.42*** 0.0586 
 (11.11) (0.215) (11.83) (0.301) (11.90) (0.301) 
Oshikoto region 14.90 -0.368* -31.93** 0.128 -37.14*** 0.145 
 (15.29) (0.199) (14.33) (0.339) (13.90) (0.335) 
N 639 639 614 614 613 613 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Although the aim of the study was to evaluate the effect of diversification on food security, we 
report briefly on other significant variables explaining food security outcomes in our model. Socio-




household head. An additional year of age of the household head is associated with an increase in 
household monthly per capita food expenditure by about 1 Namibian dollar (N$1) and household 
dietary diversity score (HDDS) by about 0.01 points. Similarly, an extra year of education of the 
household head increases the household’s monthly per capita food expenditure by about N$11 and 
the HDDS by about 0.11 points. Consistent with other studies (for example Tibesigwa and Visser, 
2016), we find that male-headed households have higher food security status in terms of per capita 
food expenditure; they out-spent female-headed households by N$50 per capita on food every 
month.  
Socio-economic variables affecting household food security include asset ownership, social 
capital, access to formal employment, and government transfers. Households owning more assets 
spend more on food, with an extra unit in the asset ownership index associated with an increase in 
monthly per capita food expenditure by N$42. Similarly, a unit increase in a household’s social 
capital index increases monthly per capita food expenditure by about N$18, implying the 
importance of kinship ties as important safety nets in rural areas. Households in which the head is 
formally employed are shown to spend about N$64 on food more per household member, and have 
about 0.6 points more in HDDS, compared to their counterparts. This underscores the importance 
of diversification beyond the farm into off-farm income sources, for household food security in 
the face of climate change. 
A non-parametric analysis 
This subsection is a continuation of the analysis above where we attempt to see how varying 
combinations of crop-livestock diversification levels affect food security. To achieve this, the crop 
and livestock diversification indices are each divided into three categories, i.e., High, Middle and 
Low diversification levels, based on the distribution of each index (note that given different 
distributions of each index, cut-off points delineating start and end of each category may be 
different). The different categories from both indices are then combined to form a 3X3 matrix of 
crop-livestock diversification levels (Table 5). Next, food security outcomes for these different 
combinations are compared using kernel densities. The aim is to see whether high diversification 
in either crop or livestock farming is more important for household food security. Of the nine 
categories, our interest is thus on the food security outcomes for the low and high combinations 




Table 2-4 Combinations of different levels of crop and livestock diversification 
Livestock diversification Crop diversification 
0.7 < 𝑥 
Low 
0.4 < 𝑥 ≤ 0.7 
Medium 
𝑥 ≤ 0.4 
High 
0.75 < 𝑥                Low   LL LM LH 
    0.45 < 𝑥 ≤ 0.75       Medium ML MM MH 
 𝑥 ≤ 0.45               High HL HM HH 
Six combinations are compared: Highly diversified in both crops and livestock (HH) versus little 
or no diversification in both (LL) (Figure 3a); little or no diversification in livestock and highly 
diversified in crops (LH) versus highly diversified in livestock and little or no diversification in 
crops (HL) (Figure 3b); highly diversified in both crop and livestock (HH) versus little or no 
diversification in livestock and highly diversified in crops (LH) (Figure 3c); highly diversified in 
both crop and livestock (HH) versus highly diversified in livestock and little or no diversifications 
in crops (HL) (Figure 3d); little or no diversification in livestock and highly diversified in crops 
(LH) versus little or no diversification in either (LL) (Figure 3e); highly diversified in livestock 
and little or no diversification in crops (HL) versus little or no diversification in either (LL) (Figure 
3f). 
As the shapes of the distribution imply, significant differences in mean expenditures are observed 
between HH and LL combinations (figure 3a), LH and LL combinations (figure 3e), and HL and 
LL combination (figure 3f). Households that are highly diversified in both crop and livestock 
farming (HH) on average spend more on food in a month compared to those with low 
diversification in both enterprises (LL). High monthly food expenditure was also noted in the low 
livestock-high crop (LH) and high livestock-low crop diversification (HL) categories, each 





Figure 2-3a-f (clockwise): Distributions of food expenditure for combinations of different levels 
of crop and livestock diversification 
No significant difference in food expenditure was observed between the low livestock-high crop 
(LH) and high livestock-low crop (HL) diversification categories. Similarly, the outcome for high 
livestock-high crop (HH) diversification category was not significantly different from that of the 
low livestock-high crop (LH) category or that of the high livestock-low crop (HL) categories. 
These results thus seem to indicate that high diversification in either crop or livestock enterprise 
leads to high food security outcomes, irrespective of which enterprise a household is more 
diversified in.  
2.8 Conclusion and policy implications 
Adapting to the changing climate is critical for rural communities residing in semi-arid regions, 
where livelihoods are already fragile. Diversification of livelihoods is a key strategy of 
strengthening the adaptive capacity and resilience of vulnerable communities. This paper finds 
that farm diversification has a positive impact on per capita food expenditure and dietary diversity, 







2 4 6 8 10









2 4 6 8 10









2 4 6 8 10









2 4 6 8 10









2 4 6 8 10








2 4 6 8 10






shows that there is no difference in food security outcomes for households that are highly 
diversified in either crop or livestock enterprises, and lowly diversified in the other. However, 
households that are highly diversified in crop and livestock enterprises achieve the highest food 
security outcomes. 
Note that the non-parametric analysis does not control for other important factors that may also 
explain food security outcomes, thus the estimated effect of crop or livestock diversification on 
food security is not conditional on other covariates. However, combining results from this 
estimation with those from the parametric regression provides for robustness check. The study 
region is semi-arid, characterized by a mix of pastoralism and subsistence crop farming, thus 
external validity of results obtained in this study may not be guaranteed for areas characterized by 
specilized farming systems. Diversification of farm enterprises may also depend much on the 
availability of land resources.  
Regardless of these limitations, results from the study offer important policy-relevant insights. 
Improving accessibility to markets is crucial for the attainment of food security, in an environment 
of increasing climatic shocks. Different areas may differ in the comparative advantage in terms of 
the agro-ecology for the production of crops or livestock. In such a case, households may thus be 
better off specializing in a particular enterprise, with adequate diversification within that enterprise 
for resilience, then accessing other food products from the markets.  
Another policy variable identified in the study as a key determinant to diversification decisions is 
that of access to climate information related to management of both crops and livestock. Extension 
advice should therefore be targeted towards improving knowledge on climate change in the region, 
and dissemination of information on the available strategies households can utilize to mitigate 
against weather variability and climatic shocks like droughts. Improvement in the number of 
extension providers in the rural areas will also ensure many farmers have access to information on 
the suite of technologies and practices that constitute climate smart agriculture, for sustainable 
production.  
The study also identifies gender as another key determinant of diversification decisions, and food 
security; male-headed households were more diversified in both crop and livestock enterprises, 
and were more food secure. Our finding suggests that female-headed households are more 




beneficial. Such policies could be in the form of special financial products specifically meant for 
women in order to enable them access credit easier. Intervention programs by development 
partners that target women have also been shown to be highly effective elsewhere in improving 
household welfare, and should be advocated for in the study region. 
Finally, the huge contribution of off-farm incomes to food security in our study further points to 
the already established concept of rural transformation as a vehicle for the development of rural 
areas in the developing world, through availing of non-farm opportunities. There is a consensus 
that climate change impacts will continue to be felt in the next few decades, despite the global 
efforts to mitigate emissions that cause the global warming problem. Policy makers in SSA thus 
need to urgently think of ways to fast-track access to non-farm opportunities in the rural areas of 
these regions, for diversified portfolio of activities that guarantee resilient livelihoods in the face 
of these challenges.  
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3 The role of the emergence of large grain traders in smallholder farm 
markets in enhancing adoption of sustainable agricultural intensification 
practices in Kenya 
Abstract 
Pervasive threats of climate change and land degradation have compounded the low farm 
productivity problem inherent in sub-Saharan Africa. Though sustainable agricultural 
intensification practices have been shown to improve resilience of farm production in the face of 
these emerging threats, they suffer low adoption rates typical of technology adoption in these 
regions. Recent evidence shows the emergence of large grain traders in the smallholder farm output 
markets. Given established correlation between contractual farm arrangements and technology 
adoption, the hypothesis is that these traders can incentivize technology adoption at scale at the 
farm level, given their financial capacity. This study tests this hypothesis using a large panel 
dataset from Kenya spanning a decade. A dynamic random effects Probit model is used to evaluate 
how past adoption of sustainable inputs influence subsequent adoption behavior, while a control 
function approach is used evaluate how sales to large grain traders affect the adoption of 
sustainable inputs at the farm level. Results indicate that sales to large grain traders lead to higher 
adoption of inorganic fertilizer but not improved seed and manure, and that land ownership is a 
key success factor in explaining sales to these market actors. The adoption of improved seed and 
organic manure is persistent across time, indicating state dependence in the use of these inputs. 
These results suggest that strategies to foster engagements between large grain traders and farmers 
can enhance uptake of inorganic fertilizer; such strategies should also be accompanied by efforts 






Farm yields in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remain low despite decades of efforts to enhance 
intensification in the region. This problem is amplified by increasing land degradation and the emerging 
threat of climate change. Consequently, there has been renewed calls for sustainable agricultural 
intensification aimed at increasing productivity without adverse effects to the environment (Pretty and 
Bharucha, 2014; Pretty et al., 2011).  
Sustainable agricultural intensification practices (SAIPs) in many areas of SSA may include inter alia, 
the use of inorganic and organic fertilizers, improved seeds, measures to conserve soil and water, and 
farm management practices such as crop rotations involving legumes, re-incorporation of crop residues, 
and selective agro-forestry practices (Manda et al., 2016; Pretty et al., 2011). adoption of these practices 
is however highly location-specific and may vary greatly by agro-ecological conditions and relative 
prices of factors such as land, labor and capital.  
Finding new or less utilized channels for bolstering SAIP use remains a topical issue for development 
economists given the ubiquitous low technology adoption problem in SSA. For the most part, policy 
has focused on how intervening directly into agricultural input and output markets (e.g., input subsidies 
and crop price supports) can nudge technology adoption. Yet it is often overlooked how changes in the 
broader food system can indirectly encourage intensification at the farm level. Traditionally, most 
smallholder farmers have sold their outputs informally to rural assembly traders and local households 
(Sitko and Jayne, 2014). While these actors provide market outlets for otherwise excluded farmers’ in 
remote rural areas, their capacity and marketing model does little to directly support sustainable 
intensification practices by smallholder farmers. Similarly, selling to big marketing parastatals, which 
usually do not pay in cash, presents a challenge to the small farmer most of whom are liquidity-
constrained (Olwande et al., 2015; Sitko and Jayne, 2014).  
This study examines how new marketing actors in Kenya’s grain value chains have affected the 
incentives and wherewithal of farmers to intensify their production patterns. These large grain traders 
(LGTs), typically do not travel to villages themselves to buy grain but buy directly from farmers at 
buying points in towns, hire agents who bear the LGT company name to travel to the villages to 
aggregate surpluses, or buy from smaller, ‘satellite’ traders without a formal affiliation (Burke, Jayne, 
and Sitko, 2019). There is a dearth of evidence on the implications of these changes in the agro-food 
industry on the production systems especially in the adoption of SAIPs in SSA. Most extant studies 
view the problem as unidirectional; how farm-level production affects marketing behavior. Emerging 
literature investigating effects in the opposite direction focus on how small contract farming 
arrangements between farmers and a particular contracting marketing actor affect farm level production 




emerging literature on backward linkage from market to production, by investigating how the entry of 
large grain traders (LGTs) in smallholder grain output markets in Kenya affect the adoption of 
sustainable intensification inputs at farm level.  
3.2 Literature review 
The functioning of output markets, including the attributes of marketing actors, may influence farm 
behavior in numerous ways.  For example, reliable and timely cash payments for farm outputs may relax 
future binding liquidity constraints that otherwise dampen adoption of intensification inputs. Evidence 
indicates that under favorable conditions, outgrower cash crop programs have encouraged greater 
farmer use of inputs in food crop farming (Govereh and Jayne, 2003). This is through exploitation of 
the synergy between the two crop types, such that even though food crops may not be highly marketed, 
farmer exposure to the market through cash crop overcomes liquidity constraints on the purchase of 
cash inputs for food production too.  
Much of extant literature that relates the leveraging of the markets for farm-level productivity is in on 
contract arrangements. Across SSA, buyers of cash crops like coffee, tea and horticultural crops provide 
farmers with inputs and advisory services and in return are guaranteed quality output. Minten (2010) 
found that smallholder farmers in Madagascar receiving inputs from processors through contract 
arrangements  increased their yields significantly when this was combined with advice from technical 
assistants. In Ethiopia, potato farmers were found to prefer contract arrangements since these insured 
them against uncertainty in the input markets (Abebe et al., 2013). Several recent studies also find that 
contract farming arrangements lead to enhanced intensification, and an improvement in welfare for the 
participating farmers (Bellemare, 2012; Maertens and Vande Velde, 2017; Ton, et al., 2018).  
While this literature relates to small scale, low volume contractual arrangements between a producer(s) 
and a group of farmers where farmers are engaged in one project at a time, the question is whether 
similar benefits can trickle down to farmers through other market actors who are not engaged in 
contractual arrangements with farmers. Recent evidence shows that large-scale grain traders (LGTs) 
have rapidly expanded their operations and become an important direct and indirect buyer of grain for 
smallholder farmers in many parts of the region (Sitko and Chisanga, 2016; Sitko et al., 2017). These 
LGTs are similar in scale to the market actors that enter into contractual farming arrangements with 
smallholder farmers, in terms of output demand and capital. While there are no formal contractual 
arrangements between these large market actors and farmers, it is interesting to assess how their 
operations may be transforming the food production systems over time. This is especially so since their 
operations have a potential to reach a large unspecified number of farmers, unlike contractual 
arrangements that happen within a smaller scale between a market player and a specific group of 




actors in enhancing farm production by looking at how LGTs affect take up of sustainable intensification 
inputs. 
3.3 Data  
3.3.1 Data sources 
Data used in this study comes from the Tegemeo Institute rural households panel data project, a 
collaborative effort between Egerton University’s Tegemeo Institute and Michigan State University. 
The dataset runs from 1997 to 2010 and covers 24 Districts in Kenya within which there are 39 Divisions 
and 120 villages (due to inadequate definition of the key variable used in this study in 2010 i.e. sales to 
LGTs, the study uses data running from 2000 to 2010). A stratified sampling technique was used to take 
into account the ecological diversity in the country where all the districts were classified into eight agro-
regional zones based on agro-climatic conditions, agricultural activities and rural livelihoods. Using 
standard proportional sampling, 1,600 farm households were then sampled randomly from the 24 
districts. Of these, 1,512 households were interviewed in 2000 and 1,309 in 2010. Attrition across the 
waves was thus relatively small and largely random (Jin and Jayne, 2013). The study uses this 
unbalanced panel data across the years in the analysis.   
A standard question put to the respondents across the four waves regarded where the household had 
sold their largest part of their grain (maize, wheat and rice) output after harvesting, with large traders 
being one of the options under consideration. This question was used to construct the key treatment 
variable of whether a household sold a large share of their grain to a large trader or not (=1 if the 
household sold to LGT, and 0 in otherwise). We acknowledge the limitation on definition of this 
variable since we rely on farmers themselves to identify the type of trader that they sold their grain to. 
To minimize errors in the measurement of the variable, adequate training was provided to the 
enumerators to help the respondents identify the trader-types using a three check criteria; the volume of 
grain bought, whether the trader comes to buy for himself or uses buying agents, and lastly, whether the 
trader operates under a company name (Burke et al., 2019). It is also worth noting that results from a 
study carried out in 2016 on LGTs in Kenya to understand their involvement in the smallholder grain 
markets (Sitko et al., 2017) largely correspond to this paper findings and increases our confidence in 
the correct identification of these market actors by the farmers. Future studies on this aspect however 
may need to find a more robust way of identifying these actors. In addition, the use of the proportion of 
sales sold to the LGTs may be a better outcome variable, rather than the binary indicator variable used 
in this study, given data availability. 
The outcome variables considered in the study are the sustainable agricultural intensification inputs 
(SAIPs) which include inorganic fertilizer, improved seed and organic manure. Again, these variables 




for manure use in the 2000 wave is however missing and only three waves were used in the analysis of 
the demand for this particular SAIP.  
3.3.2 Description of variables 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in this study. These are described in detail 
in the following section. 
Table 3-1 Summary statistics 






 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables 
Fertilizer use (1=Yes) 0.66 0.473 0.71 0.453 0.76 0.428 0.75 0.434 
Fertilizer quantity (kg) 206 398.6 190 333.9 200 340.1 169 263.8 
Fertilizer use kg/acre 90.0 306.90 83.0      326.0 82.3     288.52 76.9     118.44 
Improved seed use (1=Yes) 0.66 0.473 0.67 0.472 0.73 0.445 0.82 0.381 
Manure use (1=Yes) - - 0.74 0.438 0.77 0.422 0.78 0.415 
Manure quantity (kg) - - 1815    3146.7 1463 2494.6 1251 2002.4 
Explanatory variables 
Large Grain Trader sales (LGTs) 
(1=Yes) 
0.015 0.1197 0.007 0.0843 0.085 0.2789 0.095 0.2929 
Non-self-proportion of LGT 
sellers in district 
1.44 2.487 0.71 1.08 8.34 10.82 9.32 12.285 
Distance to extension (Km) 5.7 7.01 5.3 5.81 4.6 5.07 5.4 5.13 
Age of hh head (years) 53.1 13.97 56.4 13.57 58.6 13.42 60.5 13.22 
Gender of hh head (1=Female) 0.13 0.332 0.21 0.404 0.24 0.426 0.27 0.444 
Education of hh head (years) 6.0 4.48 6.7 5.48 8.0 3.99 8.1 4.02 
Credit constrained (1=Yes) 0.04 0.197 0.08 0.266 0.02 0.138 0.02 0.140 
Total asset value (‘00000Ksh) 1.84 3.746 2.60 11.300 3.08 9.839 3.61 8.380 
Own cultivated land (acres) 3.52 4.655 3.57 7.602 3.29 7.017 2.82 4.278 
Village level fertilizer price at 
planting time (ksh/kg) 
27.8 3.40 30.4 4.70 37.3 3.51 55.2 10.04 
Av. annual rainfall (mm) 608 261.7 722 269.8 615 202.0 430 194.7 
Agro-ecological zones controls (%) 
Coastal Lowland 5.95  6.30  6.26  6.34  
Lowland 7.94  3.58  3.58  3.44    
Lower Midland 3-6 19.11  19.97  19.67  19.56  
Lower Midland 1-2 10.98  11.24  11.18  11.23  
Upper Midland 2-6 18.92  19.40  19.52  19.56  
Upper Midland 0-1 16.87  17.75  18.26  18.49  
Lower Highland 17.53  18.83  18.48  18.26  
Upper Highland 2.71  2.93  3.06  3.13  
Sustainable intensification inputs 
Fertilizer is a critical sustainable intensification input, replenishing soil nutrients thus preventing 
nutrient mining and land degradation. In this study, fertilizer use as a dependent variable is measured 
by the proportion of households in the sample using the input, as well as the intensity of use. The latter 




these do not use the recommended rates of the input (Kihara et al., 2016; Sheahan, Black, & Jayne, 
2013). Results point to a general increase in the proportion of farmers using fertilizer from 66% in 2000 
to 76% and 75% in 2007and 2010, respectively.  In terms of intensity of use, farmers used 200kg of 
fertilizer on average in 2000, with the rate falling to about 170kg in 2010.  
Improved seed allows for the realization of higher outputs per unit of labor and land and is therefore an 
important sustainable intensification input. This explains its choice for a dependent variable in our 
study. The results show a steady increase in the proportion of farmers using the input from 66% in the 
year 2000 to over 80% in the year 2010. 
Organic fertilizer has been show to increase soil carbon and help soils capacity to utilize inorganic 
fertilizers (Marenya & Barrett, 2009). This is thus a critical sustainable intensification input ad justifies 
its inclusion as an outcome variable in our study. While our study lacks the data for the input use for 
2000, results show that on average, households used about 1800kg and 1200kg of the input in 2004 and 
2010 respectively. 
Large grain trader sales 
The key explanatory variable is an indicator whether a household sold to large traders in a season. 
Controlling for other confounders, we hypothesize that households that sell to large traders are more 
likely to invest in sustainable intensification inputs, following the conceptualized pathways discussed 
earlier in this pare i.e. higher prices for produce, credit facilities, knowledge sharing, etc. Table 1 show 
the proportion of these type of traders jumping from about two percent in 2001 to ten percent in 2010. 
The transition matrix in Table 2 shows how farmers enter and exit the LGT market across the waves. 
The results show significant movement in the proportion of farmers entering and exiting the LGTs 
market. Of the farmers who were selling to LGT in 2000, only five percent of these were still selling to 
LGTs in 2004 with the rest exiting the market (95%) in same time period. These initial LGT sellers 
however come back to the market with 23% and a further 43% of the farmers who sold to LGTs in 2000 
doing so again in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Likewise, about one percent of the farmers who did not 
sell to LGT in 2000 entered the market in 2004 and the proportion grew to eight and nine percent of 





Table 3-2 A transition matrix of LGT sales across the panel 
 LGT seller (%) Non- LGT seller (%) 











2000 4.6 (1) 22.7 (5) 42.9 (9) 95.4 (21) 77.3 (17) 57.1 (12) 
2004  11.1 (1) 11.11 (1)  88.9 (8) 88.9 (8) 















2000 0.6 (8) 8.2 (106) 8.9 (112) 99.4 (1330) 91.8 (1,181) 91.1 (1144) 
2004  8.5 (113) 9.5 (123)  91.5 (1220) 90.5 (1177) 
2007   7.4 (89)   92.6 (1110) 
N in parenthesis 
The results also show that a large proportion of the farmers who did not sell to LGTs in 2000 remain 
outside this market segment, with 99.4% of these still not selling to LGTs in 2004. This proportion 
however reduces to 91.8% and 91.1% in 2007 and 2010 respectively, after a few new entrants into the 
LGT market in these years. The results show some stability in later waves, where 31.8% of the farmers 
who sold to LGTs in 2007 still do so in 2010, with68.2% exiting the market over the same time period. 
This is significant especially since the proportion of new entrants is growing in the same time period.  
Other covariates 
Institutional, financial and physical infrastructure are key determinants of technology diffusion and have 
been used ubiquitously in studies similar to ours. In this study, distance to extension in is used as an 
indication of access to extension advice, while questions on need for, and lack of (inadequate) access to 
needed credit, are used to construct a credit constraint variable, as an indication of whether a household 
was credit constrained or not. The hypothesized correlation between credit constraint and SAIP adoption 
is thus negative. Total asset value is used to control for household wealth, which could also affect the 
likelihood of adopting SAIPs. The survey also asked for village level prices of inorganic fertilizer at 
planting time, and this variable is included in the analysis of fertilizer demand since cost of inorganic 
fertilizer has been identified as a key constraint to adoption and use rates of the input (Sheahan, Black, 
& Jayne, 2013). 
Land ownership is also important for two reasons; first, it is an important economic indicator in the rural 
areas, and secondly, the amount of land a household cultivates determines the quantity of an 
intensification input to use. The results in Table 1 show that the amount of cultivated land controlled by 
households is gradually decreasing, from about 3.5 acres in 2001 to 2.8 acres in 2010, indicating 




households have been shown to explain technology adoption, and are included in the study as additional 
control variables.  
 A variable capturing the average annual rainfall (mm) experienced at cultivated plot is also included to 
control for annual variation in rainfall across regions. The use of SAIPs could vary from region to region 
depending on the agricultural potential, which might also be affected by shocks across time. Fertilizer 
demand has for example been shown to be elastic to profitability, which is in turn affected by prevailing 
productivity conditions. Controlling for rainfall in estimating the demand for SAIPs is thus instructive 
given that most smallholder production in the region is rain-dependent. 
3.4 Estimation strategy and empirical models  
This study investigates the effect of LGT sales on farmers’ likelihood of adopting a sustainable 
agricultural intensification input (SAIP). The decision to adopt a SAIP is partly explained by unobserved 
idiosyncratic factors like risk attitudes and ambition, which could also be correlated with the explanatory 
variables like in this case, the decision to sell to LGT. Access to panel data presents an opportunity to 
study important dynamics in input adoption. For example, the role of intensification inputs on 
productivity enhancement is uncontested in the literature. Thus, the adoption of a SAIP in one season 
can lead to higher incomes, which potentially relaxes liquidity constraints and enhance SAIP take up in 
subsequent periods. Likewise, some treatment effects are persistent. For example, Sitko et al (2018) 
found that farmers selling maize to a large grain trader obtained about six percent higher farm-gate price 
for maize than farmers selling to other types of buyers, controlling for market access conditions and 
month of sale. Households selling to a LGT may therefore obtain greater revenue from their output, 
enabling them to purchase more cash inputs or hire labor in subsequent seasons to utilize labor-intensive 
SAIPs, and/or foster formal or informal CFAs that enable them to get inputs on credit in subsequent 
seasons 
Model selection in panel data analysis is guided by researcher assumptions regarding unobserved 
heterogeneity. In the case where there is correlation between the explanatory variables at time t (𝑿𝑡) 
and the error term at time t (µ𝑡) , or explanatory variables at time t (𝑿𝑡) are correlated with past period’s 
error term (µ𝑡−1), a pooled OLS estimator will be inconsistent. If only the latter is assumed to hold, a 
random effects (RE) estimator will be consistent but if the first and/or second case is assumed, only the 
fixed effects (FE) estimator will be consistent (Wooldridge, 2002). The FE method is problematic to 
use with non-linear models though since it involves subtracting the means of time-varying variables 
across T (1 … 𝑇) for each individual from the observed variable values at t. Time-invariant variables 




We adopt various models and functional forms that control for these issues, discussed in following 
subsections. First, we use a dynamic Probit model that analyzes the dynamic process of SAIPs adoption, 
while controlling for unobserved characteristics and initial conditions problem. This model assumes 
that there is no endogeneity between our key variable, LGT sales and the outcome variables, sustainable 
agricultural intensification inputs (SAIPs) adoption. This naïve assumption is used to test for dynamism 
in SAIPs adoption, and not causation between LGT sales and SAIPs adoption. Next, we make a more 
reasonable assumption of non-randomness in treatment (LGT sales) and adopt the control function 
approach to account for this. Lastly, we recognize the fact that demand for certain SAIPs like inorganic 
fertilizer is not necessarily linear; first, a farmer decides whether to use or not, given prevailing 
circumstances, then decides on how much to use. We thus adopt a Double Hurdle functional form to 
account for this corner solution problem.    
3.4.1 The dynamic random effects Probit model 
The conceptual model for SAIPs adoption can be represented as; 
                                         𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                              (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is a latent indicator of SAIP adoption (𝑦𝑖𝑡=1 if adopted and 0 otherwise) by household i in 
time period t; LGT is the indicator variable of interest i.e. if the household had LGT sales in year t; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
is a vector of exogenous variables that explain SAIP adoption like gender, access to information, 
employment status etc.; 𝑘𝑖 is a unit-specific time-invariant unobserved effect; and  𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic 
error term.   
To capture the dynamic adoption process, we include lags of dependent variables as additional 
regressors;  
                       𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛾𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                           (2) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 represents past SAIPs adoption decisions; Even if we assumed that 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (µ𝑡, 𝑋𝑡) = 0 from 
equation 1, this cannot hold in equation 2. This is since errors in past time periods 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 are correlated 
with current ones 𝑢𝑖𝑡, by inclusion of the lagged variables. A pooled OLS would be inconsistent in this 
case.  
In the case where key explanatory variables are not expected to vary much, FE estimators lead to 
imprecise estimates (Wooldridge, 2002 pp 286).  The key determinants to SAIPS use are hypothesized 
to be age, gender and education of household head, all of which are time constant across the panel. The 
key explanatory variable may also not vary much since only about two percent of farmers sell to LGTs 
out of the total sample in 2000, with this proportion raising to about ten percent in 2010; a large 




to year. A fixed effects estimator may therefore not be best suited for our analysis due to the incidental 
parameter problem. Likewise, it’s not plausible to assume that the unobserved heterogeneity in our 
model is orthogonal to all the explanatory variables (thus satisfying the exogeneity assumption), based 
on the preceding discussion earlier in this section. Thus, a random effects estimator would also yield 
inconsistent estimates. Empirical studies facing this issue (for example Muyanga et al., 2013) use the 
correlated random effects (CRE) framework to overcome the shortcomings of both the FE and RE 
estimators.  
In the CRE framework, the unobserved heterogeneity is modelled as; 
                                    𝑘𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝐺𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?+𝛼2?̅?𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖                                                  (3) 
Where 𝑘𝑖 is the time-invariant household-specific unobserved heterogeneity; 𝐿𝐺𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅? and ?̅?𝑖 represent the 
means of time-varying explanatory variables across T (𝑡 = 1, … . , 𝑇); and 𝑎𝑖 is the household-specific 
error term. Our analysis follows this framework to correct for unobserved effect. 
By including lagged depended variable to study dynamics in sustainable agricultural intensification 
inputs (SAIPs) adoption, we introduce a potential bias where the unobserved heterogeneity as modelled 
above could be correlated with the initial observation, 𝑦𝑖0. The assumption being made here is that the 
stochastic dynamic process started when the households in the sample were observed in the first period 
(𝑡0). This is unreasonable since if we are assuming a dynamic process with previous behavior informing 
subsequent decisions, then adoption of SAIPs prior to 𝑡0 should also affect adoption decisions within 
the panel period. These effects will be captured in the unobserved heterogeneity and need to be 
controlled for, for a genuine estimation of state-dependency in SAIPs adoption.  
3.4.2 Controlling for initial conditions in the unobserved heterogeneity 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013) show that Wooldridge's (2005) simple solution of modelling the 
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity conditional on the initial values might result in serious bias 
when used with constrained models that includes the means of time-varying explanatory variables, like 
the CRE above. The solution suggested by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013) was that of including  
the initial-period explanatory variables as additional regressors in modelling the unobserved 
heterogeneity. This solution was shown to be more efficient in the case of short panels, like in our case.  
This study thus adopts the CRE framework where the unobserved heterogeneity is modelled by 
including within-means of time-varying variables, then adding the values of the explanatory variables 
at the first wave of the panel, to control for the initial conditions problem following Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal (2013). From equation 3, the unobserved heterogeneity is thus adjusted to: 




where 𝑦𝑖0, 𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑖0, and 𝑿𝑖0 represent values for sustainable agricultural intensification inputs (SAIPs), 
LGT sales, and other time-varying explanatory variables at 𝑡0, respectively; 𝐿𝐺𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅? and ?̅?𝑖 are the means 








𝑖=0 ; and 𝑎𝑖 is the normally distributed household-specific error term 
with zero mean and variance 𝛿𝑎
2.  
Replacing for 𝑘𝑖 in equation 2 and holding the assumption that the term captures the unobserved 
heterogeneity, 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 can then be interpreted to capture the genuine state dependence of SAIPs adoption 
on past adoption behavior. The equations are then estimated in STATA using the command developed 
by Grotti and Cutuli (2018). For comparative purposes, we also estimate equation 2 (where we assume 
there is no unobserved heterogeneity in our model) and report these results.  
3.4.3 Non-random selection into large-grain-trader markets 
The dynamic model described above explains how marketing behavior may influence SAIPs adoption 
decisions, controlling for time-invariant unobserved characteristics and the initial conditions problem 
in dynamic models. It could also be the case that there are time-varying unobserved variables that cannot 
be controlled for by the above procedure. A valid concern may be whether this adequately controls for 
the obvious self-selection problem; farmers endowed with assets like land are able to generate high 
outputs, thus have the economies of scale to sell to LGTs. While our hypothesis is that selling to LGTs 
enable farmers to utilize SAIPs more, it could as well be the case that using SAIPs enables a farmer to 
generate higher outputs, which then enables them to participate in markets where volume of sales may 
matter, like LGT markets.  
The control function approach has been used in studies similar to ours to solve this problem (Asfaw, 
Pallante and Palma, 2018; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, and Chirwa, 2011). The approach requires an 
instrumental variable (IV) that should be correlated with the potentially endogenous variable but not 
correlated with the error term in the structural model when conditioned on other covariates. In our case, 
we use the non-self-proportion of farmers in a district selling to LGTs as an instrument in the reduced 
form equation, which is then excluded in the structural fertilizer demand equation. The number of other 
farmers residing in the same district that are selling to LGTs would also inform the decision of a 
particular farmer to sell to these market actors. Accessibility of these LGTs in town markets within the 
district, the production potential in the district, land ownership dynamics in district would all reasonably 
imply farmers within such districts would sell to LGTs, given other farmers doing within the district. 
There is also little reason to believe that after conditioning on other covariates, the non-self-proportion 
of farmers selling to LGTs in the district would be directly correlated with the error term in the fertilizer 




Unlike in the previous dynamic random effects Probit model where we adopted a binary indicator of 
SAIPs adoption, we now shift the analysis to consider continuous dependent variables for manure and 
inorganic fertilizer. The literature indicates that sub-optimal use of fertilizer leads to yield stagnation 
(see for example Sheahan, Black, and Jayne, 2013). Thus, while a farmer may be using the input, they 
might be using less than the optimal quantity resulting in low yields. This motivates the shift from binary 
indicators of organic and inorganic fertilizer use to total quantities used in kilograms. To complete the 
analysis and following the conceptualization that LGTs sales in a particular year may not necessarily 
affect SAIP use that year but in subsequent ones, which in turn enhances future likelihood of selling to 
LGTs and using SAIPs, we include lagged SAIPs use/demand to capture this dynamism.   
We implement the following equation in the first stage; 
                                        𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ = Ω𝑖𝑃𝑟𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑠𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑿𝑖𝑡+σ𝑖?̅?𝑖 + ℰ𝑖𝑡                           (5) 
where 𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗   is the latent indicator if a household i sold to LGTs in year t; 𝑃𝑟𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑠𝑑𝑡 captures the non-
self-proportion of farmers selling to LGTs in district d at year t; 𝑿𝑖𝑡 is a vector of exogenous explanatory 
variables; ?̅?𝑖 are the Mundlak augmenting means of time-varying explanatory variables; and ℰ𝑖𝑡 is the 
idiosyncratic error term. 
Residuals from the first stage are included in the following second stage regression for improved seed 
use and quantity of manure used;  
                         𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ /𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑖?̂? + 𝛽𝑖𝑿𝑖𝑡+𝐿𝐺𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅? + σ𝑖?̅?𝑖 + ℰ𝑖𝑡                    (6) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ /𝑦𝑖𝑡 is binary indicator of improved seed use and quantity of manure in kilograms, 
respectively; 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 captures lagged dependent variable; 𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑖?̂? is the residual term obtained from 
equation 5; and  ℰ𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term; the other terms are as defined before.  
3.4.4 The corner solution problem in fertilizer adoption  
The control function approach discussed above, and the inclusion of Mundlak means of time-varying 
variables as additional covariates, control for endogeneity issues in estimating SAIPs adoption. An 
additional challenge in analyzing sustainable agricultural intensification inputs (SAIPs) demand is the 
issue of separate decisions on whether to use a particular SAIP, and how much of the SAIP to use. This 
is especially so in the case of inorganic fertilizer where a large percentage of farmers do not use the 
input, hence a non-trivial number of zero outcomes in the dependent variable.  
Functional forms that account for this nonlinearity in demand of inorganic fertilizer include the Double 
Hurdle and Type 1 Tobit models. While the former is more flexible in the assumptions of the decision 
process in the two hurdles (i.e. whether to use fertilizer or not, and how much to use), the latter is more 




attention the first hurdle. We follow Croppenstedt, Demeke and Meschi (2003) and Ricker-Gilbert, 
Jayne, and Chirwa (2011) in using the double hurdle model for panel data to analyze fertilizer demand, 
following Engel & Moffatt (2014).  
Equation 6 for fertilizer demand is thus broken into two for the two hurdles; hurdle 1 is a Probit 
estimation of the probability of a household using fertilizer i.e. 
          𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡
∗ = φ𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + Ω𝑖𝐷𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑖?̂? + 𝛽𝑖𝑿𝑖𝑡+𝐿𝐺𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅? + σ𝑖?̅?𝑖 + ℰ𝑖𝑡          (7) 
where 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡
∗  is the latent indicator of fertilizer use; 𝐷𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑡 is household i distance to extension advice, 
which is used as the selection instrument for the identification of the model; and the other terms are as 
defined in equation 6. 
The second hurdle is specified as; 
   𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑇𝑖?̂? + 𝛽𝑖𝑿𝑖𝑡+𝐿𝐺𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅? + σ𝑖?̅?𝑖 + 𝛿𝐼𝑀𝑅 + ℰ𝑖𝑡          (8)        
where Fertkgit is quantity of fertilizer used in kg; 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 is the lagged demand for fertilizer; IMR 
are the inverse mills from the first hurdle (equation 6); and the other terms are as defined before. 
3.5 Results 
In this section, results from the described models in section 3 are presented. First, we present the 
dynamic random effects Probit results, followed by results from the first stage of the control function 
approach. The second stage results are presented next, starting with the double hurdle estimation of 
fertilizer demand, followed by those from a Probit and OLS estimation of improved seed and manure 
adoption, respectively.  
3.5.1 Dynamic random effects Probit model results 
For comparative purposes, we present results from pooled Probit regressions (equations 1) and the 
random effects dynamic Probit model (equations 2). Only results from the random effects dynamic 
Probit model are discussed in this section. The results show that previous adoption of all SAIPs except 
inorganic fertilizer affect current adoption status suggesting sustainability in the adoption of these 
SAIPs, perhaps given the relatively lower costs of seed and manure (usually from own production) 
compared to fertilizer. LGT sales are positively correlated with fertilizer use and improved seed but not 
manure. This result could imply the significant role that LGTs play in enabling households to access 
relatively expensive inputs like fertilizer and improved seed. The above results are further interrogated 





Table 3-3 Results from Pooled and random effects dynamic Probit models 
 Equations 1 Equations 2 
 Fertilizer Improved 
seed 
Manure Fertilizer Improved 
seed 
Manure 
Lag. dependent   1.517*** 1.302*** 0.962*** 0.126 0.396*** 0.539** 
variable (0.130) (0.0931) (0.202) (0.191) (0.144) (0.211) 
LGT sales 0.327 0.620*** -0.194 0.932*** 0.532* -0.0190 
 (0.199) (0.226) (0.132) (0.307) (0.323) (0.203) 
Distance to  -0.0220*** -0.00759 -0.00830 -0.0271*** -0.00245 -0.00542 
extension (0.00717) (0.00610) (0.00868) (0.0102) (0.00841) (0.00765) 
HH age 0.00891*** -0.00526** 0.00163 0.0114 -0.0145 -0.0111 
 (0.00315) (0.00259) (0.00327) (0.0126) (0.00923) (0.0108) 
HH gender -0.212** -0.259*** -0.155 -0.299* -0.315*** -0.142 
 (0.0853) (0.0769) (0.110) (0.154) (0.120) (0.102) 
HH education 0.0401*** 0.0157* 0.00325 0.0429** 0.000434 -0.00559 
 (0.0113) (0.00830) (0.0107) (0.0178) (0.0123) (0.0120) 
Credit  -0.326** -0.133 0.0121 -0.645*** -0.172 0.0338 
constrained (0.164) (0.148) (0.324) (0.238) (0.196) (0.314) 
Asset value  -0.0189* 0.0185 0.0263* -0.0509*** -0.0157 -0.00230 
(‘00000Ksh) (0.0103) (0.0128) (0.0148) (0.0185) (0.0131) (0.0138) 
Own cultivated  0.0294** 0.0399*** -0.0193 0.0518 -0.00399 -0.0267 
land  (acres)  (0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0350) (0.0285) (0.0247) 
Av. village  0.000695 - - -0.00400 - - 
Fertilizer price (Ksh/kg) (0.00464)   (0.00623)   
Av. annual  0.000236* 0.000271** -0.000374 0.000858*** 0.000715*** -0.000174 
rainfall (mm) (0.000141) (0.000132) (0.000237) (0.000259) (0.000186) (0.000202) 
AEZ controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Mundlak means NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Initial conditions NO NO NO YES YES YES 
       
N 3,430 3,430 2,094 3,430 3,430 2,094 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
                                                     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Among the socio-demographic variables and consistent with many others studies, the results show that 
female-headed households are less likely to adopt inorganic fertilizer and improved seed while 
households with higher educated household heads are more likely to use inorganic fertilizer. On the 
other hand, credit constrained households and those that are far from extension extension advice are less 
likely to use fertilizer. Lastly, more annual rainfall induces a higher likelihood of using fertilizer and 





3.5.2 Results from the control function approach   
First stage results- Determinants of LGT market participation 
The results from the first stage of the control function approach are presented in Table 4. The second 
equation (column 2) includes Mundlak augmenting means as additional regressors; these results are 
interpreted. The results show that the instrumental variable, non-self-proportion of farmers selling to 
LGTs in the district, highly explains a farmer’s sale to LGTs. Specifically, a one percentage point 
increase in the non-self-proportion of farmers selling to LGTs in a district increases a farmer’s 
probability of selling to LGTs by 0.03.  
Table 3-4 Drivers to LGT sales - First stage of the control function approach results 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 
 LGT sales LGT sales 
Non-self-proportion of  0.0357*** 0.0347*** 
LGT sellers in district (0.00368) (0.00374) 
HH age 0.00155 -0.00316 
 (0.00370) (0.00400) 
HH gender 0.0469 0.0490 
 (0.102) (0.102) 
HH education  0.0334*** 0.0136 
 (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Credit constrained  -0.127 -0.259 
 (0.229) (0.257) 
Asset value (‘00000Ksh) -0.0296*** -0.0336*** 
 (0.00802) (0.00772) 
Own cultivated land (acres) 0.0513*** 0.0517*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0149) 
AEZ controls YES YES 
Year controls YES YES 
Mundlak means NO YES 
Constant -4.884*** -5.969*** 
 (0.642) (0.760) 
   
N 4,926 4,926 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Among other explanatory variables included in the model, area of own land cultivated highly explain 
sales to LGTs. An extra acre of owned cultivated land increases the probability of selling to LGTs by 
0.05. This result highlights the self-selection issue in the type of farmers who sell to LGTs; farmers 
owning larger land areas for cultivation can take advantage of economies of scale to produce enough 
surplus and sell to LGTs, since these mostly buy in bulk. 




Table 5 presents results on the estimation of the determinants of improved seed and manure adoption. 
After controlling for unobserved time-invariant variables in equation (2), sales to LGTs are shown to 
explain the adoption of improved seed at 95% confidence interval, but insignificant in explaining 
manure adoption. Past use of both SAIPs however highly explain current use of the same, pointing to 
the dynamism in SAIPs adoption and possibly reinforced by subsequent sales to LGTs as hypothesized. 
This result is similar to one obtained from the dynamic random effects Probit model.  
Table 3-5 Drivers to improved seed and manure adoption  
 Equations 1 Equations 2 








     
Lagged dep. var 1.302*** 0.278*** 1.246*** 0.261*** 
 (0.0936) (0.0254) (0.0969) (0.0252) 
LGT sales 0.642*** -184.5 0.451* -338.1 
 (0.225) (186.4) (0.266) (264.4) 
Distance to  -0.00751 -15.08 -0.00715 -11.41 
extension (0.00607) (11.78) (0.00625) (11.85) 
HH age -0.00518** -5.224 -0.00752*** -10.22** 
 (0.00259) (4.570) (0.00275) (5.009) 
HH gender -0.257*** -219.8** -0.274*** -235.4** 
 (0.0769) (94.67) (0.0797) (96.83) 
HH education 0.0178** 29.28** 0.00253 -6.915 
 (0.00872) (14.18) (0.00889) (15.09) 
Credit constraint -0.141 -245.8 -0.119 -73.34 
 (0.149) (320.5) (0.189) (349.6) 
Asset value  0.0168 41.77** -0.0221* -10.85 
(‘00000Ksh) (0.0127) (19.03) (0.0117) (21.27) 
Own cultivated land 0.0431*** 42.62* 0.00496 131.0*** 
 (0.0140) (23.81) (0.0230) (46.08) 
Av. annual rainfall  0.000257* -1.523*** 0.000455*** -1.078*** 
(mm) (0.000133) (0.249) (0.000143) (0.241) 
Selection residual 0.0599 437.9*** 0.0283 319.9*** 
 (0.0904) (117.0) (0.0985) (121.1) 
AEZ controls YES YES  YES YES  
Year controls YES YES  YES YES  
Mundlak means NO YES NO YES  
Constant -284.9*** -184.5 -312.5*** 138,899** 
 (50.46) (186.4) (54.69) (69,772) 
     
N 3,047 1,896 3,047 1,896 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
                                                 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other results from this analysis indicate that age of the household head is negatively correlated with 
both improved seed and manure use, with an extra year of age decreasing the amount of manure used 




household head decreases the probability of using improved seed by 0.3, and the amount of manure 
used by over 235 kg. On the other hand, an increase in the size of own cultivated  land by an acre 
increases the quantity of manure used by 131kg, while a millimeter (mm) increase in rainfall decreases 
this quantity by about a kilogram, perhaps signifying the inverse relationship between land productivity 
and soil fertility enhancing SAIPs. Conversely, the amount of annual rainfall is positively correlated 
with improved seed use. 
Determinants of fertilizer adoption 
As discussed in section 3, we apply the double hurdle model to analyze fertilizer demand. As before, 
the second equations control for unobserved variables through the inclusion of means of all the time-
varying variables as additional regressors and are interpreted in this section. In the selection equation, 
the first selection equation (distance to extension) is negatively correlated to the decision to use 
fertilizer, implying that the further away a farmer is from extension advice, the lower the likelihood of 
adopting the input. The included lagged fertilizer use variable shows that past use of the SAIP highly 
informs adoption in subsequent years. Similarly, lagged fertilizer quantity positively affects current 
amount of fertilizer used.  
Table 3-6 Drivers to fertilizer use – results from the Double Hurdle approach 
 Hurdle 1 Hurdle 2 Hurdle 1 Hurdle 2 
 Probability of 
using fertilizer 
Quantity of 





Distance to extension -0.0343** - -0.0345** - 
 (0.0158)  (0.0154)  
Group membership -0.0624 - -0.0282 - 
 (0.210)  (0.206)  
Lag. dependent variable 2.895*** 0.307*** 2.900*** 0.274*** 
 (0.451) (0.0168) (0.444) (0.0175) 
LGT sales 0.144 107.8*** 0.153 112.5*** 
 (0.396) (22.17) (0.382) (25.98) 
HH age 0.00472 0.530 0.00487 -0.0258 
 (0.00840) (0.492) (0.00809) (0.492) 
HH gender -0.315 -30.05* -0.306 -32.95** 
 (0.227) (15.84) (0.220) (15.57) 
HH education 0.0384 7.212*** 0.0399 4.378*** 
 (0.0279) (1.410) (0.0271) (1.451) 
Credit constraint -0.631 -65.01** -0.722* -41.27 
 (0.433) (29.70) (0.401) (34.20) 
Asset value (‘00000Ksh) 0.0367 0.307 0.0219 -4.454*** 
 (0.0405) (1.414) (0.0345) (1.667) 
Own cultivated land -0.0375 34.67*** -0.0366 29.39*** 
 (0.0241) (1.799) (0.0227) (2.804) 
Av. village Fertilizer  -0.0160 -0.860 -0.00936 -1.819* 
 price (Ksh/kg) (0.0176) (0.973) (0.0161) (1.065) 




(mm) (0.000383) (0.0246) (0.000372) (0.0470) 
Selection residual 0.652*** 12.63 0.574*** 11.10 
 (0.247) (11.07) (0.219) (11.31) 
AEZ controls YES YES  YES YES  
Year controls YES YES  YES YES  
Mundlak means NO NO YES YES  
Constant -448.5* -22,603* -436.6* -8,596 
 (253.6) (13,092) (259.8) (14,813) 
     
N 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,757 
Standard errors in parentheses 
                                                  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
The results also show that sales to LGTs significantly affect the amount of fertilizer a household uses, 
but not the decision on whether to use fertilizer or not. This is a departure from earlier result obtained 
from the dynamic random effects Probit model which indicated sales to LGTs matter in the decision to 
participate in fertilizer market, and confirms the appropriateness of modelling fertilizer demand as a 
two-hurdle problem. Specifically, farmers who sell to LGTs on average use about 113kg of fertilizer 
more, compared to those that do not. Given that land size has been found to be positively correlated to 
fertilizer use, this high amount of fertilizer is not surprising. Selling to LGTs thus increases the rate of 
fertilizer used, through either of the channels discussed earlier; mitigation of market risks through 
forward contracts hence inducing more fertilizer use, offering higher output prices hence more incomes 
to buy more fertilizer, facilitating acquisition of inputs on credit, and information provision. 
Sociodemographic variables important in explaining fertilizer demand include education and gender of 
the household head. An extra year of education of the household head increases the amount of fertilizer 
used by about 4kg, while being a female household head decreases this amount by about 33kg. On the 
other hand, being credit constrained decreases the likelihood of using fertilizer by 0.7, while an extra 
acre of own-cultivated land increase the quantity of fertilizer used by about 29kg. Ownership of huge 
tracts of cultivated land however lowers the likelihood of using fertilizer, perhaps due to economies of 
scale where use of intensification inputs may not be necessary to realize high outputs. Lastly, an increase 
in the average village fertilizer price decreases the quantity used of fertilizer used by about two 
kilograms. 
3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
The effect of farm productivity on commercialization is unequivocally established in the literature, and 
so is the effect of commercialization on welfare. Emerging literature assess the duality of the problem 
i.e. whether commercialization can induce farm productivity through incentivizing technology use and 
demand for extension. Most of this literature however is based on case studies of contractual 
arrangements between particular market actors and groups of farmers. This study extends this emerging 




incentivize the use of sustainable agricultural intensification inputs (SAIPs) namely, inorganic fertilizer, 
improved seed, and organic manure.  
The study uses a large dataset spanning a decade that permits the use of innovate methods to investigate 
the dynamic process of technology adoption, as well as, control for unobserved effects that confound 
most cross-sectional analyses. This not only allows us to interrogate the effect of past SAIPs adoption 
on current adoption behavior, but also the correlation between past and current sales to LGTs and SAIPs 
adoption. The study then uses a control function approach to investigate the effect of sales to LGTs on 
SAIPs adoption. The results show that sales to LGTs affect fertilizer demand but not that of improved 
seed or manure. This result is robust across all the analytical methods used in the study. Results from 
the dynamic random effects Probit model also show that use of improved seed and manure is persistent 
across years, unlike fertilizer whose past use does not affect current use.  
The results imply the importance of the link between LGTs and SAIPs adoption (especially fertilizer) 
at the farm level. Given the critical role played by inorganic fertilizer in improving land productivity 
and the documented soil degradation in SSA, this linkage has important implications. Studies have 
already shown that farmers in the region are under-utilizing fertilizer (e.g. Sheahan et al., 2013). Policies 
that aim to strengthen and scale-out these LGTs-farmer engagements are desirable and should be 
pursued, as alternative interventions to enhance not only adoption but also the use rates of fertilizer.  
Another important issue regards the factors identified in the study as key to explaining sales to LGTs, 
for example land ownership. Poorer farmers who face barriers in accessing these LGT markets may 
further be marginalized if these market actors crowd-out other smaller traders, who are the primary 
source of market for land-poor farmers. Strategies to improve the competitiveness of these smaller 
traders may thus be desirable in the short-run. On the production side, efforts to aggregate output from 
low-output producing farmers through formation of producer associations would mitigate the output 
barriers to accessing LGT markets, thus enabling the trickle down of the benefits of these engagements, 
even to land-poor farmers.  LGTs may also be subsidized for their costs in engaging with lowly-
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4 Weather Uncertainty and Demand for Information in Agricultural Technology 
Adoption; Case of Namibia 
Abstract 
Climate change has compounded the uncertainties inherent in agriculture. Farmers have to make 
decisions faced with increasingly fluctuating weather, leaving them vulnerable. Access to climate-
related information in developing countries, incidentally also the hardest hit by adverse effects of 
climate change, is very limited. Given a choice set of technologies that yield different payoffs depending 
on seasonal weather outcomes, ambiguity arising from imprecise weather information may lead to sub-
optimal choices. Using data from a framed experiment carried out with 300 farmers in northern 
Namibia, this study investigates how uncertainty about the weather affects farmers’ decision making. 
To establish the demand for weather information, the study elicits farmers’ willingness to pay for 
information at different levels of uncertainty. The experiment results show that high levels of weather 
uncertainty, in addition to subjective ambiguity aversion, dampen technology uptake. There is also a 
high demand for weather information that reduces this uncertainty, regardless of individual attitudes 
towards uncertainty. The results also show that access to weather information enables farmers to make 
welfare improving choices given a set of farming technologies. These results highlight the importance 
of investing in the provision of weather information to farmers as a means of enhancing take-up of 






More than before, decision makers in the agricultural sector have to contend with an 
increasingly uncertain environment due to effects of climate change. Access to timely weather-
related information can help these farmers prepare through adaptive or coping strategies to 
dampen the negative effects of climate change (Singh et al. 2017; Di Falco, Veronesi, and 
Yesuf 2011). While sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been projected as the region to be most 
affected by the negative effects of climate change (Pretty et al. 2011), it is also the region where 
availability and access to climate-related information is weakest (Mason et al., 2015).  
The slow rate of technical change in developing countries has been blamed on low rates of 
diffusion of new technology to targeted populations. For the most part, development 
economists have attributed this problem to institutional barriers to adoption. Fairly recent 
literature describes poor farmers as caught in poverty traps due to underlying liquidity 
constraints and aversion to uncertain technologies, creating an inertia in the take-up of risky 
but high-yielding production technologies (Brick and Visser, 2015; Cole et al., 2013; Giné and 
Yang, 2009). Most literature on time preference also shows poor farmers to exhibit high 
discount rates, thus failing to invest in projects with no immediate returns (an exception is a 
recent study by Liebenehm and Waibel (2014) that surprisingly shows wealthier farmers to be 
more impatient). This has brought to the fore behavioural attitudes as key drivers in the 
technology diffusion and rural development literature (Feder and Umali, 1993). 
While extant literature has explored how aversion to uncertainty affects agricultural technology 
uptake (Elabed and Carter 2015; Alpizar et al., 2011; Akay et al. 2012; Takahashi 2013), there 
is a dearth of evidence on how reducing this uncertainty improves technology adoption 
decisions. This is an important aspect in the fight against climate change since it gives 
prominence to the role of weather information provision in the adoption of stress-adapted 
technologies. To fill this gap in the literature, our study utilizes both survey data and a framed 
experiment to assess how providing weather information improves adoption decisions for 
improved agricultural technologies among smallholder farmers.  
Further, the study elicits the willingness to pay (WTP) for such information at various levels 
of uncertainty, to establish its demand. While most weather information is publicly provided, 
studies show that this information is usually unreliable due to short lead time, frequency and 
accuracy (Tall, Coulibaly, and Diop 2018; Njau 2010). Eliciting demand for weather 





4.2 Choice under imprecise information 
Ellsberg's (1961) seminal work revived the problem of “Knightian uncertainty” in decision 
theory, whereby decision makers are faced with imprecise information on the likelihood of an 
event happening. This has seen an upsurge of research interest on imprecise information in 
decision making, both in theoretical and applied economics work. An unequivocal consensus 
as evidenced by studies shows that aversion to uncertainty affects decision making. For 
example, Yates and Zukowski (1976) found that subjects were willing to bet more on a bag 
where the precise number of blue and red chips was known compared to one where they did 
not have information on the proportion of chips in the bag.  
Most of these studies assume decision making under complete uncertainty (where probability 
distributions are completely unknown). In most life decisions, however, decision makers have 
some information regarding the distribution of the likelihood of an event happening. This is 
exemplified in seasonal weather information, for example, which is the subject of interest in 
this article; farmers have some priors based on their farming experience and peer networks. 
One of the relevant early studies to investigate choice behaviour when a decision maker has 
formed some priors is Becker and Brownson (1964), who define ambiguity as any distribution 
of probabilities other than a point estimate.  
Other recent literature on uncertainty with priors includes Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), who 
posit that, given too little information in a bet to form a prior, the decision maker takes the 
minimum expected utility (MEU) over all priors in a probability set to evaluate the bet. 
Ghirardato et al. (2004) generalized the MEU model to allow decision makers to assign 
different weights on the minimum and maximum expected utility leading to the α-MEU model. 
Of interest is whether the effects of a decision maker’s (DM’s) “revealed” ambiguity on a 
dependent variable can be separated into its components: individual attitude towards ambiguity 
and the range of ambiguity itself.  From these studies, it is not clear whether exhibiting a large 
aversion to ambiguity is due to the DM being more pessimistic (subjective) or due to the 
information being more imprecise (objective) (Hayashi and Wada, 2010). Klibanoff et al. 
(2005) explores what happens if a DM’s ambiguity aversion is decreased while holding the 
priors and risk attitude constant or, conversely, what happens if the perceived priors change, 
holding ambiguity and risk attitudes constant. In their experiment, Hayashi and Wada (2010) 
controlled for the objective part (set of priors) and attempted to elicit the subjective part 




Guided by the above premise of the separate effects of the subjective and objective sources of 
observed ambiguity, this study aims to look at the separate effects of subjective ambiguity 
aversion and objective uncertainty aversion on technology choice. To our knowledge, this is 
the first study to investigate this in the agricultural setting. Close studies include Tonsor (2018), 
who has looked at how uncertainty and reference point (best outcome experienced before) 
shape decision making among cattle producers in the United States.   
Likewise, other similar studies have for the most part only looked into the subjective part of 
ambiguity aversion. For example, Cardenas and Carpenter (2013) found that ambiguity 
aversion was negatively correlated with well-being measures among participants drawn from 
Latin America. On climate change, Alpízar et al. (2011) focus on adaptation and show that 
ambiguity-averse farmers are more likely to take up adaptation measures in the face of climate 
change. Andrews et al. (2018), on the other hand, focus on mitigation and show experimentally 
that individuals invest in high-risk, high-reward mitigation technologies, thus exhibiting risk-
seeking behaviour, when the stakes are high and certain but low-rewarding options are not 
sufficient to mitigate emissions. 
Working on index-based insurance, Elabed and Carter (2015) focus on whether farmers exhibit 
aversion to compound risk and how this affects take-up of agricultural index-based insurance. 
Mcintosh et al. (2015), on the other hand, elicit coffee farmers’ WTP for index-based insurance 
under varying degrees of rainfall and basis risk and compare this with a predicted optimal WTP 
given the expected utility with and without insurance, thereby exploring behavioural responses 
to probabilistic insurance. Our elicitation of subjects’ WTP for uncertainty-reducing 
information (weather information) is similar in approach to Mcintosh et al. (2015), but our 
focus is on demand for weather information under various uncertainty levels, a novel 
contribution in the agricultural technology adoption literature.  
Investigating farmers’ choices under different uncertainty levels given their subjective attitudes 
towards uncertainty is an important aspect in the intervention space, especially relating to 
information provision. The implications of the study are of significance due to the rising 
uncertainty in farming environments driven by increasing climate variability. Predicting 
weather outcomes is now harder even among experienced farmers, and providing weather 




4.3 Study area and weather information use 
The Namibian climate is characterized by sparse and erratic rainfall, with 92% of the land area 
defined as hyper-arid, arid or semi-arid (Tadross and Johnston, 2012). Most of the rain in the 
country is received in the northern part, which also has the highest population (Mendelsohn et 
al., 2002).  Climate change is already affecting the fragile systems therein and projected 
impacts are grave unless urgent adaptive measures are taken (Reid et al., 2007). UNDP (2015) 
puts Namibia as the seventh most at-risk country in terms of climate change-related agricultural 
losses.  
In the survey conducted in conjunction with this experiment, 52% responded that they receive 
information on weather regarding the management of their crops, while about 45% responded 
likewise regarding livestock management (See Figure 1). In an attempt to see if there is demand 
for climate information among non-recipients, we asked the remaining 48% and 55% that do 
not receive climate information on crop and livestock management respectively how they 
would use this information if they received it.  
 
Figure 4-1 Access to climate information for crop and livestock management 
For crop management, a majority indicated they would change timing of activities, e.g., 
planting time (36%), while 28% indicated they would change crops and/or crop varieties that 
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Figure 4-2 Potential uses for climate information among non-recipients 
On the other hand, of those who did not receive climate information on livestock management, 
a majority indicated they might not use such information even if it was available to them (29%), 
a clear indication of the lack of awareness of strategies to mitigate against livestock losses in 
case of climate stressors like drought. However, 23% indicated they would use the information 
to manage stock size through selling and a further 25% felt that getting climate information 
might enable them to store livestock feed better (see Figure 2b). 
4.4 Sample selection 
Selection of the sample followed two procedures: first, selecting respondents for the survey 
and second, selecting participants for the experiment. To achieve the first, a multistage 
sampling procedure was used to select 600 households from three regions in northern Namibia. 
In the first step, the three regions (Oshana, Omusati and Oshikoto) were purposively selected 
based on agricultural productivity and exposure to climate change. In the next step, one 
constituency was selected from Oshana, one from Oshikoto, and three from Omusati, 
representing the diversity within the regions. Random proportionate to size sampling was then 
employed to determine the number of villages from each constituency to include in the sample, 
with 10 households from each village being randomly selected for the study.  
In the second process, a criterion of basic literacy was set to select who among the survey 
respondents would be included in the experiment. Qualifying participants had a minimum 
education level of grade three and could read and write in the local language (Oshiwambo). 
Given the low qualification criteria, many respondents in the survey qualified (an average of 
seven out of ten per village). However, logistical challenges, where the experiment team had 



































village could be included, since some arrived late. Thus, at the end of the exercise, only half of 
the surveyed respondents participated in the experiment (see Table 1). 
Table 4-1 Participant Characteristics (n=300) 
Variable Omusati Oshana Oshikoto Overall 
Gender (% female) 78 71 67 72 
Age (years) 49.4 (16.6) 48.3 (18.4) 51.3 (15.8) 49.7 (16.9) 
Education level 
(grade) 
7.8 (3.2) 7.4 (3.5) 7.0 (3.5) 7.5 (3.6) 
A high proportion of households in the study region are female-headed, as reflected in the 
sample. Mean education level was high, with the median participant having attained grade 7, 
though the dispersion around the mean is large given that the lowest level attained was grade 
three. While this may appear to show high education levels in the region, one must take into 
account that the participants were selected conditional on having gone to school. This is not 
unique in experimental studies where participants need to have some basic literacy level. 
4.5 An overview of experimental tasks completed 
There were five series of games to play in an experiment session (see Table 2). First, 
participants completed a simple risk experiment aimed at eliciting risk preferences (series 1), 
then moved on to a framed experiment involving choices of different technologies to use for 
farming in a typical season under varying chances of good weather. The framed experiment 
had four series of games (series 2 to 5). In series 2, the chances (probabilities) of good weather 
were disclosed to the participants before playing the games, while in series 3 the participants 
were only told the range of chances (probability set) within which good weather was likely to 
occur in the season.  




at [..] probability (set) 
of good outcome 
Series 2 
Technology choice 
under risk at [..] 




under uncertainty at 
[..] probability set 
of good weather 
Series 4 
WTP for 
information at [..] 





at [..] probability set 
of good weather 
50% 30%  0-100%  0-100%  0-100%  
0-100%  50%  20%-40%  20%-40%  20%-40%  
 70%  10%-50%  10%-50%  10%-50%  
  60%-80%  60%-80%  60%-80%  
  50%-90%  50%-90%  50%-90%  
After completing series 3 games, where the chances of good weather in the season were 




purchase information on the precise probability of good weather. In the fifth and final series 
(series 5), participants played series 3 games again, but this time some had information on the 
precise probability of good weather (those who purchased information in series 4) and others 
knew only the range within which the chance of good weather was likely to occur (those who 
did not purchase information).   
4.6 Experiment design 
This section presents designs of the risk preference elicitation methods, the framed experiment, 
and the elicitation of the willingness to pay for weather information. 
4.6.1 Choice under risk and uncertainty  
A pre-test was conducted in the study area (in a region outside the sample) prior to collecting 
the data. This revealed that a detailed risk and ambiguity aversion elicitation method (e.g. the 
commonly used multiple price list) fatigued the participants before they got to play the framed 
experiment games. A simpler version similar to the one by Eckel and Grossman (2002) was 
therefore adopted (see Table 3).  
Table 4-3 Risk Preferences Elicitation 
Gamble Payoffs ✓ 
Low outcome High outcome 
1 24 24  
2 18 36  
3 12 48  
4 6 60  
5 0 72  
Participants were presented with five gambles, each with two possible outcomes. The 
probability of occurrence for the high outcome was set at 50% for the risk game and completely 
unknown for the ambiguity game.  
Risk aversion measure 
We let the number of the gamble be an index measure of the underlying continuous risk level. 
From the framing, an extremely risk-averse individual would sacrifice expected payoffs for 
certainty, thus opting for gamble 1, while moderately risk-averse participants would go for 
gambles 3 or 4.  Conversely, risk-neutral participants would go for the maximum expected 
payoff, preferring gamble 5. Risk-seeking participants would also opt for a higher-risk option 
even if it involves the same or lower expected payoff and thus would choose gamble 5 (Eckel 





Ambiguity aversion measure 
Following Klibanoff et al. (2005) and Cardenas and Carpenter (2013), we define ambiguity 
aversion with reference to a participant’s risk aversion. In this regard, we use the standard 
deviations of the choices (high and low outcomes) so as to create a continuous measure, rather 
than use the discrete choices themselves. Ambiguity aversion is thus measured as the difference 
in the standard deviation of choice under risk and that under ambiguity. The constructed 
measure is therefore decreasing in ambiguity aversion; the lower the measure, the higher the 
degree of ambiguity aversion. Results show that the sample distribution of the measure is 
almost symmetrical with a mean of -0.47, implying a slightly higher proportion of the sample 







Figure 4-3 Sample distribution of ambiguity aversion measure 
Following Cardenas and Carpenter (2013), we also allow for a spline specification where the 
ambiguity aversion measure is split into those who are strictly ambiguity averse (negative 
values of the ambiguity aversion measure) and those who seek more risk under ambiguity 
(positive values of the ambiguity aversion measure). This allows for a kink in the relationship 
between ambiguity aversion and the dependent variables discussed in the following sections, 
i.e., 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖(𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖)  + 𝛽2𝑖 max {𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 −𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖, 0} + 𝜃𝑿𝑖 + 𝜺𝒊 
where 𝑦𝑖 is the dependent variable of interest (e.g., choice of technology), 𝑿𝑖 is a vector of 
controls and 𝜺𝒊 is an error term; and ‘𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖’ is a measure of a participant’s 
reaction to uncertainty as explained above. The spline specification allows for the more 
ambiguity-averse (negative measure) participants to have different outcomes from the ones 
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4.6.2 Technology choice: A framed experiment  
The experiment adopts a within-subjects design to test how uncertainty shapes decisions over 
three technology choices. In the framing, a participant chooses a technology to use in a typical 
farming season from among three options: an off-farm work option, a seed technology adapted 
to climate stressors such as drought (‘adaptive seeds’), and an improved seed technology 
(hybrid seed) (see Table 4). The off-farm work option has a constant payoff of N$75 in both 
good and bad weather outcomes and is analogous to the sure bet option in standard risk-
aversion elicitation methods. The second option is that of an adaptive seed technology that is 
resilient even in bad weather, giving a net payoff of N$25 and a high of N$150 in good weather. 
The last option of improved seed technology has the highest payoff in good weather (N$225) 
but gives a negative payoff (-N$25) in bad weather. The negative payoff indicates that the 
farmer incurs costs, yet gets very low or zero returns in bad weather, thus incurring losses.  
In similar studies (Brick and Visser, 2015; Jumare et al., 2018) , ‘traditional seed’ is used in 
lieu of the ‘off-farm work’ option to represent resilience of landraces in bad weather. In our 
study area, this might be true in the case of sporadic rainfall but is unrealistic in the case of 
droughts, which are growing in frequency and which lead to crop failure even for the traditional 
seeds. There exist several government and non-government organizations (NGO) funded 
programs in the study area; hence, the adoption of this framing is salient for the participants. 
Drought-resistant and hybrid seed varieties exist in the area too; hence, they are familiar 
concepts to the participants. The framing for the payoffs for each of these technologies, while 
not the same as in reality, reflects the payoff of each technology relative to the other. For 
example, while improved seeds do well in good weather compared to adaptive seeds, the latter 
do better in bad weather. One is also paid if working off-farm, whether the weather for that 
season is bad or good. 
Table 4-4 Risk and Uncertainty Games 
 
Choice 
Weather outcome Expected payoffs given probability (set) 
Good Bad 50%; 0-100%  30%; 20%-40%; 10%-50% 70%; 60%-80%; 50%-90% 
Off-farm work 75 75 75.0 75.0 75.0 
Adaptive seeds 150 25 87.5 62.5 112.5 
Improved seeds 225 -25 100.0 50.0 150.0 
Given the potential loss in the third option under the bad weather outcome, we made sure the 
initial endowment given to participants to incentivize the games was enough to cover this. We 
also varied the amount given to participants in different sessions (N$30 and N$60) to control 




games in each of the series (risk or uncertainty games) were randomized but participants always 
completed the risk games first before proceeding to the uncertainty games, in order to increase 
salience.  
4.6.3 Willingness to pay for weather information  
After playing the third series of the games (uncertainty games), we introduced the possibility 
of reducing this uncertainty by receiving information on the precise probability of good 
weather in the season. Participants were given the opportunity to purchase this information 
before playing the uncertainty games again. The Becker, Degroot and Marschak (1964) 
(hereafter BDM) method was used to incentivize the payments and elicit true WTP for the 
uncertainty-reducing information (weather information). Participants first stated their WTP, 
then a random price was drawn. If the stated WTP was equal to or above the drawn price, the 
participant received information; if it was lower, the participant was not given information. 
This was done for all the five uncertainty ranges represented by the different probability sets 
of good weather (the fourth series of the games). All participants played the uncertainty games 
a second time (the fifth and last series of the games) either with or without information on 
precise probabilities of good weather as determined using the BDM method explained above.    
Most of the climate- (weather) related information in developing countries is provided for free, 
either by government agencies or development aid organizations. Thus there is little cost 
information on which to base our bidding prices. Ultimately, a price range of 0 - N$25 was 
chosen based on participants’ ability to pay using the initial endowments given and expected 
payoffs. A zero-information cost was included to capture the non-willingness to pay for some 
probability sets and is in congruence with the actual situation on the ground where information 
is given out for free.   
4.7 Experiment procedures 
As mentioned in the preceding section, the experiment adopted a within-subject design where 
participants completed all the games in the five series (see Table 2), i.e., two games in series 
1; three games in series 2; and five games each in series 3, 4 and 5. Given the low literacy 
levels of the participants, a key concern was to make sure that the length of the experiment did 
not compromise data quality due to fatigue. Each session was thus split into two, where series 
1 to 3 games were played first before a half-hour refreshment break, then the rest of the games 
completed. The games were also made as easy as possible to understand, using visual aids as 




At the beginning of the experiment session, participants were given cards as they entered the 
venue, indicating the experiment number and showing them where to sit. The games were then 
explained, including how winning (and losing) would occur in the games. Participants were 
told that they had been allocated money for showing up, which they could use to pay for any 
losses in the games, as well as use to buy information in the WTP games. The remaining 
amount plus any winnings in the games would be handed out at the end of the sessions. This 
point was reiterated several times during the course of the games especially where it involved 
incurring losses and in the payment for information games. To disentangle the wealth effect on 
decisions made in the games, the initial endowment was varied at N$30 (low) and N$60 (high) 
and randomly assigned in sessions. This does not seem to have had any effect on choice 
behaviour, based on the results presented later in the results section.   
The study utilized big posters translated to the local language, Oshiwambo, to represent the 
games. To explain concepts such as probability, white and black balls were used, where the 
black balls represented the probability of good weather. To explain a 30% probability of good 
weather, for instance, three black and seven white balls were put in an opaque bag and 
participants were told that if a black ball was drawn, the weather for that game (season) was 
good. Practice rounds were played to demonstrate this. Similarly, in the uncertainty rounds, 
participants were told that the bag could contain a range of a number of black or white balls 
depending on the particular probability set of good weather under consideration. In the 20%-
40% probability set, for instance, the bag could contain two black and eight white balls, or 
three black and seven white balls, or four black and six white balls. This was demonstrated in 
examples, and the big posters representing the game also had these different variations of 
possible bag compositions drawn on the side.  
In the WTP for weather information games (series 4), after the participants in a session had 
finished indicating how much they were willing to pay for information in a particular 
probability set, one of them volunteered to draw a card from a stack labelled 0 to 25. The drawn 
number represented the actual cost of the information and participants with equal or above 





Figure 4-4 Spinning wheel to determine precise probabilities (60%-80% uncertainty range) 
Next, a wheel with the appropriate number of ball variants for the specific probability set (e.g., 
the example in Figure 4) was spun to determine the precise probability of good weather. This 
was done discreetly and the information revealed to only the participants who qualified to 
receive information.   
4.8 Results and discussion  
Results from the experiments and a discussion of these findings are presented next. 
4.8.1 Risk and ambiguity aversion measures 
Consistent with similar field experiment studies (Brick and Visser, 2015; Cardenas and 
Carpenter, 2013), the results of the baseline risk gamble show prevalent risk aversion in the 
sample with a mean choice of 2.94, which is closest to lottery gamble 3 (see Table 5).  
Table 4-5 Risk and Ambiguity Preferences (n=300) 
The distribution in the complete uncertainty framing is similar to the risk framing but shifts 
slightly to the left to represent more conservative choices under ambiguity, as seen in Figure 3 
earlier in this article. For example, more participants chose the ‘safe’ gamble (gamble 1) under 
uncertainty (15%) than under risk (13%). Likewise, more chose the riskiest option (gamble 5) 
under risk (12%) than under uncertainty (10%). The mean choice of 2.89, however, is most 
similar to the one under risk and corresponds to gamble 3. 
Gamble Payoff  Expected payoff 
(50% prob.) 
Risk  (standard 
deviation of payoff) 
Frequency (%) 
Low  High Risk choice Ambiguous choice 
1 24 24 24 0 13.24 15.33 
2 18 36 27 9 23.69 22.30 
3 12 48 30 18 31.36 31.01 
4 6 60 33 27 19.51 21.25 
5 0 72 36 36 12.20 10.10 




4.8.2 Technology choice under risk and uncertainty 
Next we investigate how participants’ attitudes towards risk and uncertainty affect technology 
choice. As expected, the mean choice of technology was highest at 70% and lowest at 30% 
probabilities of good weather (see Figure 5a). Because our choice variable is increasing in 
riskiness and expected payoffs (0=Off-farm work; 1=Adaptive seed; 2=Improved seed), this 
implies that with a higher probability of good weather, participants opted for riskier 
technologies associated with higher expected payoffs, relative to the safe but low return option 
(off-farm work). The opposite applies for low probability of good weather (30%). At a 50% 
probability of good weather, the mean choice corresponds to the adaptive seed option, 
indicating the trade-off of high expected payoffs in the improved seed option for low variance 
in yields associated with the adaptive seed option.  
Under uncertainty, the mean choice was highest at the 60%-80% probability sets and lowest at 
the 20%-40% probability sets (see Figure 5b). Observed mean choice at complete uncertainty 
(0-100% probability set) is about the same as that at the 50% risk level, corresponding to the 
adaptive seed option. Given the wide range of uncertainty, participants seem to choose a low 
variance technology to “hedge” against risk, while still getting a better expected payoff than 
the baseline option (off-farm work). This zero-variance, low expected payoff option is mostly 
chosen for the low probability sets (20%-40% and 10%-50%), as the low mean choices for 
these probability sets reveal.  
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On the other hand, participants go for riskier, higher-yielding technologies in probability sets 
with higher probabilities of good weather (50%-90% and 60%-80%). Non-parametric tests 
using a Wilcoxon sign-rank test show that these differences in choices are significant (see Table 
6). 






z Prob > |z| 
Risk choices 
30 50 -3.595 0.0003 
30 70 -7.909 0.0000 
50 70 -7.445 0.0000 
Uncertainty choices 
20-40 10-50 -3.579 0.0003 
20-40 60-80 -8.081 0.0000 
20-40 50-90 -6.183 0.0000 
20-40 0-100 -4.845 0.0000 
10-50 60-80 -5.381 0.0000 
10-50 50-90 -3.372 0.0007 
10-50 0-100 -1.928 0.0539 
60-80 50-90 3.123 0.0018 
60-80 0-100 4.414 0.0000 
50-90 0-100 2.110 0.0349 
Higher preference for riskier technologies at 60%-80% probability than at 50%-90% 
probability could imply that participants over-weight the lowest probability in the set, thus 
choosing more conservatively at 50%-90%, in line with the MEU theory discussed before. The 
reverse happens for lower probability possibility sets, however, where more participants 
choose the safe option at 20%-40% probability than at 10%-50% probability. It would thus 
seem that for low probability sets, the highest possible probability in the set, rather than the 
lowest, biases the choice. The choice under the 0-100% probability set seems to confirm this, 
as riskier choices are made in this set compared to 10%-50% and 20%-40%, even though the 
least possible probability in this set is zero.    
Risk aversion and technology choice 
To build up the analysis, we first look at the effect of risk aversion on choice under the risk 
scenarios (30%, 50% and 70%). In the analysis, we control for socio-demographic and 
household characteristics of the participant, such as education, age, gender and household 
income. We also control for the initial wealth given to each participant at the start of the 




proportional odd ratios; the risk-aversion measure is standardized to one standard deviation 
and zero mean.  
Risk aversion significantly affects choice of technology at 50% and 70% probability of good 
weather; as risk aversion increases, participants are more likely to opt into the off-farm work 
(“safe”) option relative to adaptive and improved seed options. Specifically, for a one standard 
deviation increase in risk-aversion attitude, the odds of opting into off-farm work relative to 
the adaptive and improved seed options are 1.28 and 1.36 times greater at the 50% and 70% 
probabilities of good weather outcome, respectively. 
Pooling across the risk levels enables us to look at the effect of the probability levels of good 
weather in addition to the effect of risk aversion. As expected, results show that as the 
probability increases from 30% (baseline) to 50% and 70%, the odds of opting into on-farm 
activity (adaptive and improved seed options combined) relative to off-farm work increases. 
Specifically, for an increase in the probability of a good weather outcome from 30% to 50%, 
the combined odds of opting into adaptive and improved seed options relative to off-farm work 
are 1.6 times greater. These odds are even greater (4.8 times) for an increase in the probability 
of good weather from 30% to 70%. 
Risk aversion in the pooled regression still affects technology choice in the same direction as 
in the individual probability levels. For a one standard deviation increase in risk-aversion 
attitude, the odds of opting into off-farm work relative to the combined options of adaptive and 





Table 4-7 Technology Choice under Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 30% 50% 70% Pooled  
     
Risk aversion 0.886 1.280** 1.363*** 1.142* 
 (0.102) (0.152) (0.162) (0.0864) 
Initial wealth 0.991 1.137 1.122 1.077 
 (0.141) (0.167) (0.166) (0.102) 
Gender 1.030 0.860 0.678 0.843 
 (0.268) (0.230) (0.186) (0.146) 
Age 1.001 1.007 1.006 1.004 
 (0.00807) (0.00794) (0.00833) (0.00522) 
Occupation 0.996 1.000 1.007 1.002 
 (0.0208) (0.0214) (0.0220) (0.0140) 
Education 0.934* 1.026 1.072* 1.007 
 (0.0372) (0.0411) (0.0443) (0.0264) 
Household size 0.973 0.983 1.000 0.981 
 (0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0401) (0.0249) 
Tropical Livestock  0.985 1.006 1.036** 1.009 
Units (TLU) (0.0148) (0.0139) (0.0167) (0.00919) 
Marital status 1.002 0.917 0.860* 0.931 
 (0.0744) (0.0709) (0.0667) (0.0462) 
Income  0.982 0.994 0.982 0.988 
(‘0000) (0.0155) (0.0121) (0.0116) (0.00810) 
50%    1.642*** 
probability    (0.260) 
70%    4.756*** 
probability    (0.828) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Individual and household control variables do not seem to explain choice in the pooled data. 
However, education level, livestock holdings (measured in tropical livestock units or TLU) and 
marital status explain choice at a 70% probability of good weather. An increase in one year of 
education increases the combined odds of opting for adaptive and improved seed technologies 
by 1.07 times relative to the off-farm work option, while an extra TLU score increases the same 
odds by 1.04. At a 30% probability of good weather, an increase in a year of education increases 
the odds of opting for off-farm work relative to adaptive and improved seeds, implying 
prudence given the low probability of good weather. 
Ambiguity aversion and technology choice 
Results for the relationship between ambiguity aversion and technology choice are shown in 
Table 8, also displayed as proportional odds ratios and with the ambiguity aversion/seeking 




significantly affects choice for the 20%-40% and 10%-50% probability sets, while an 
ambiguity-seeking attitude affects choice in the 0-100%, 20%-40% and 10%-50% probability 
sets. For a one standard deviation increase in ambiguity aversion, the odds of opting into off-
farm work relative to combined adaptive seed and improved seed technologies are 1.8 times 
greater when the probability set is 20%-40%, and 1.6 times greater for a 10%-50% probability 
set.  
Table 4-8 Technology Choice under Uncertainty 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 0-100% 20%-40% 10%-50% 60%-80% 50%-90% Pooled 
       
Ambiguity  1.217 1.812** 1.592** 0.973 1.105 1.267** 
aversion (0.246) (0.434) (0.333) (0.197) (0.224) (0.141) 
Ambiguity  0.675* 0.666* 0.575*** 1.062 0.817 0.745*** 
seeking (0.139) (0.153) (0.120) (0.225) (0.168) (0.0841) 
Initial  0.989 1.409** 0.865 1.006 1.053 1.048 
wealth (0.143) (0.213) (0.122) (0.148) (0.152) (0.0828) 
Gender 1.210 0.624* 1.332 0.795 1.314 1.024 
 (0.318) (0.175) (0.341) (0.213) (0.338) (0.146) 
Age 1.008 1.008 1.006 0.997 1.000 1.004 
 (0.00800) (0.00827) (0.00800) (0.00827) (0.00776) (0.00436) 
Occupation 0.976 0.980 0.987 0.981 0.975 0.980* 
 (0.0203) (0.0214) (0.0207) (0.0213) (0.0205) (0.0113) 
Education 1.003 0.956 1.016 1.055 1.014 1.009 
 (0.0403) (0.0393) (0.0419) (0.0426) (0.0397) (0.0220) 
Household  0.988 1.135* 1.064 0.944 1.011 1.030 
size (0.0750) (0.0873) (0.0796) (0.0721) (0.0752) (0.0425) 
TLU 0.991 0.922* 0.993 0.909** 0.952 0.953** 
 (0.0401) (0.0386) (0.0370) (0.0372) (0.0375) (0.0205) 
Marital  0.987 0.992 1.010 1.048*** 1.001 1.006 
status (0.0137) (0.0151) (0.0144) (0.0177) (0.0125) (0.00753) 
Income  0.990 0.999 0.995 0.994 0.987 0.993 
(‘0000) (0.0139) (0.0148) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.00686) 
20-40  -     0.446*** 
probability      (0.0719) 
10-50       0.767* 
probability      (0.120) 
60-80       2.025*** 
probability      (0.325) 
50-90       1.269 
probability      (0.198) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The results also show that the ambiguity-seeking participants are opting for the safe option 




odds are about 43% higher for off-farm work relative to the combined odds of adaptive and 
improved seed options). Compared to their ambiguity-averse counterparts, however, the odds 
for off-farm work for the ambiguity-seeking are slightly less. For example, for the 20%-40% 
probability set, the odds for opting for the off-farm option relative to the combined odds of 
adaptive and improved seed options are 81% for the ambiguity-averse and only 33% for the 
ambiguity-seeking (1 less 0.67). 
Pooling across the probability sets enables us to look at the important aspect of how choices 
differ with different ranges of probability sets, in addition to attitudes towards ambiguity. In 
Table 8, the baseline is complete uncertainty, i.e., the 0 to 100% probability set. A reduction in 
the range of uncertainty from 0-100% to 10%-50% or 20%-40% has the effect of increasing 
the odds of opting for off-farm work relative to adaptive and improved seed options. An 
explanation for this could be that farmers are more willing to take risks under a wider 
probability set (0-100%), which includes high possible probabilities in the set compared to 
narrower probability sets (20%-40% and 10%-50%), which have low highest-possible 
probabilities in the set. The result for the 60%-80% probability set seems to confirm this, 
whereas decreasing the range of uncertainty from 0-100% to 60%-80% has the opposite effect; 
the odds of opting for combined options of adaptive and improved seed relative to off-farm 
work are more than twice as high.  
4.8.3 Demand for weather information under uncertainty 
Results show that, on average, participants’ WTP was more than N$12.5 for all the uncertainty 
ranges. The highest range of uncertainty (0-100%) had the highest mean WTP, with the median 
range (10%-50%; 50%-90%) having the second-highest mean WTP, and the lowest range 





 Figure 4-6 Mean WTP at different uncertainty ranges (probability sets) 
Non-parametric tests show that these differences are significant (see Table 9); the wider the 
range of uncertainty, the higher the amount participants were willing to pay for information on 
precise probabilities of good weather. The amount paid in the complete uncertainty round was 
significantly higher than that paid in any other uncertainty range. In the low probability sets, 
more was paid in the 10%-50% range than in the 20%-40% probability set, while in the high 
probability sets, more was paid in the 50%-90% range than in the 60%-80% probability set. 
Comparisons between low and high probability sets that have an equal uncertainty range show 
no significant mean differences in WTP. Participants pay the same for the 20%-40% and 60%-
80% probability sets as for the 10%-50% and 50%-90% probability sets. This implies that, 
under similar uncertainty levels, improving their understanding of the chance of having good 
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Table 4-9 Tests for Difference in Mean WTP for Information under Different Uncertainty 
Ranges 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
To complete the analysis,  a comparison between a low probability set with a narrower range, 
e.g. 20%-40%, and a high probability set with a wider range, e.g. 50%-90%, shows that 
participants pay more for the latter than the former. Similarly, participants pay more for low 
probability sets with a wider range, e.g., 10%-50%, compared to a high probability set with a 
narrower range, e.g.,  60%-80%. 
The third and fourth columns show that the mean WTP for ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-
seeking/neutral participants are quite similar. Both categories of participants value information 
similarly and are willing to pay significantly more for information in wider ranges of 
uncertainty than in narrower ones. One can thus conclude that subjective ambiguity aversion 
does not seem to be important in explaining willingness to pay for information, but rather the 
range of uncertainty (objective ambiguity aversion) helps explain WTP. To investigate this 
further, we ran a regression analysis to see what informs WTP, controlling for observables and 
attitudes towards uncertainty. 
These results are displayed in Table 10. The dependent variable is continuous (0 to 25) 
indicating the possible range of WTP in the games. Ambiguity aversion/seeking attitudes are 
as discussed before and a categorical variable for the pooled data regression (last column) 









0-100 20-40 4.85*** 5.56*** 7.84*** 
0-100 10-50 2.58** 3.31*** 5.04*** 
0-100 60-80 5.19*** 5.30*** 7.89*** 
0-100 50-90 3.17*** 3.70*** 5.76*** 
20-40 10-50 -2.18** -2.22** -4.01*** 
20-40 60-80 0.33 -0.11 0.15 
20-40 50-90 -1.46 -1.79* -2.96*** 
10-50 50-90 0.66 0.42 1.05 
10-50 60-80 2.51** 2.06** 3.90**** 




Table 4-10 Determinants of Willingness to Pay for Weather Information 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 0-100% 20%-40% 10%-50% 60%-80% 50%-90% Pooled 
       
Ambiguity 
aversion 
-0.0232 0.0956 0.0757 0.111 0.105 0.0379 
 (0.0551) (0.0782) (0.0711) (0.0805) (0.0752) (0.0479) 
Ambiguity 
seeking 
0.0569 -0.125 -0.103 -0.0224 -0.121 -0.0120 
 (0.0995) (0.140) (0.128) (0.144) (0.136) (0.0876) 
Initial wealth -0.914* 0.821 -0.627 -0.327 0.147 -0.226 
 (0.546) (0.760) (0.706) (0.783) (0.745) (0.497) 
Gender 0.717 0.677 -0.289 0.218 -0.251 0.119 
 (0.987) (1.370) (1.273) (1.410) (1.347) (0.896) 
Age 0.0298 0.0325 0.0342 0.00867 0.0139 0.0221 
 (0.0303) (0.0420) (0.0391) (0.0432) (0.0413) (0.0275) 
Occupation -0.0258 -0.114 -0.0798 0.0802 0.0778 -0.0144 
 (0.0797) (0.111) (0.103) (0.114) (0.109) (0.0726) 
Education -0.109 -0.291 0.265 -0.284 -0.202 -0.135 
 (0.151) (0.209) (0.195) (0.215) (0.206) (0.137) 
Household size -0.0758 0.434** 0.335* -0.246 -0.102 0.0655 
 (0.148) (0.205) (0.191) (0.211) (0.202) (0.134) 
TLU 0.0138 -0.150** 0.00979 -0.0739 0.00490 -0.0387 
 (0.0515) (0.0714) (0.0665) (0.0736) (0.0703) (0.0468) 
Marital status 0.0786 -0.484 -0.0413 0.170 -0.544 -0.151 
 (0.281) (0.390) (0.364) (0.402) (0.384) (0.256) 
Income (‘0000) -0.0142 -0.0494 -0.0963 -0.0418 0.0555 -0.0295 
 (0.0474) (0.0657) (0.0612) (0.0676) (0.0647) (0.0431) 
20-40 
probability 
- - - - - -5.334*** 
     (0.628) 
10-50 
probability 
- - - - - -2.844*** 
     (0.628) 
60-80 
probability 
- - - - - -5.436*** 
     (0.628) 
50-90 
probability 
- - - - - -3.448*** 
     (0.627) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The analysis confirms that attitudes toward uncertainty do not affect participants’ WTP but the 
level of uncertainty does. Specifically, compared to the baseline probability set category (0-
100%), a probability set of 20-40% receives N$5.3 lower in WTP while a 50%-90% probability 
set receives N$3.4 lower. These results underscore the value of weather information to farming 




4.8.4 Choice after receiving uncertainty-reducing information  
As explained under the section on methods, the information (precise probability) given to 
participants was randomly generated based on the probability set under consideration. It is 
interesting to see whether decisions made before the information games (series 4 of the games) 
were significantly different from those made after the information games, whether or not a 
participant received information. While the preceding  discussion shows that farmers value 
weather information, it is interesting to see what they would do with this information, i.e., 
whether assessing weather information leads to a change in technology choice and whether that 
change is welfare-improving.   
Non-parametric tests show that in all but one of the rounds, the choices made before and after 
receipt of information are significantly different for participants who received information (see 
Table 11). This is very similar for participants who did not receive information, with the 
choices made before and after the information games being significantly different in three out 
of the five uncertainty ranges (note that all participants made choices after the information 
games, whether or not they received information on precise probabilities of good weather 
outcomes). For the lower probability sets (20%-40% and 10%-50%), participants became 
conservative in their choices after the information games, whether or not they received 
information.  
Conversely, in the probability sets with high possible probabilities of good weather (0-100%, 
60%-80% and 50%-90%), riskier but high-yielding technologies were chosen after the 
information round for participants who received information. Those who did not receive 
information changed their choice only for the complete uncertainty probability set (0-100%). 
Table 4-11 Test for Difference in Choice before and after Information 
Probability set (%) Received information Did not receive information 
z  Prob > |z z Prob > |z|  
20-40 0.360  0.7189 2.544 0.0110  
10-50 3.296  0.0010 2.835 0.0046  
0-100 -1.824 0.0682 -1.734 0.0829 
60-80 -2.060  0.0394 -1.239 0.2152  
50-90 -2.234  0.0255 -1.334 0.1821  
The results imply that technology uptake is higher when farmers have access to weather 
information, especially if this indicates higher chances of good weather, compared to a 




weather are low, weather information can help farmers avoid losses by choosing adaptive 
technologies or other safer options.  
To ground these conclusions further, analysis is required on whether access to information 
actually made the recipients better off as a result of their choices, since non-recipients of 
information also changed their before and after information choices. To do this, we use the 
randomly generated precise probability revealed to the qualifying participants to calculate the 
expected payoffs after the information rounds for both the recipients and non-recipients of 
information. These are then compared to the expected payoffs before the information games, 
calculated using the expected probability for each of the probability sets. The results of this 
analysis are shown in Table 12. 
Table 4-12 Comparison of Expected Payoffs of Choice before and after Information 
Uncertaint
y range 

























20-40 66.65 65.34 0.54 8.70 66.24 68.99 -1.15 
10-50 61.02 68.17 -
1.09** 
10.70 61.68 63.29 -0.45 
0-100 91.45 105.88 -
2.35** 
9.77 97.78 101.75 -0.38 
60-80 128.79 132.0 -0.71 10.60 133.51 135.68 -0.48 
50-90 130.61 133.96 -0.61 11.36 118.51 118.54 -
0.005 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Providing information to participants enabled them to make choices with higher expected 
payoffs for the complete uncertainty (0-100%) and 10%-50% uncertainty range scenarios. The 
sub-sample of non-recipients of information made no welfare-improving changes in their 
before and after choices for any of the uncertainty ranges. The most important point of these 
results is that in cases where real losses are imminent with low chances of good weather, 
providing information helps people make welfare-improving changes. This is more so with 
high levels of uncertainty and very low possible probabilities of good weather, as exemplified 
in the 10%-50% and 0-100% probability sets. This is intuitive, since providing information 
would not matter much for welfare if the possible chances of good weather were all high, for 




of the 20%-40% probability set, where, no matter the information provided, everything points 
to low chances of good weather and hence the best response is to use the safest technology. 
We complete the analysis by considering whether the decisions made to buy information at a 
particular cost by the participants are rational. Considering only the uncertainty ranges that 
resulted in welfare-improving changes after purchase of information, the 0-100% uncertainty 
range seems the most cost-effective, in that participants spent N$10 on average and gained an 
extra N$14.  However, as stated earlier, climate information is a public good given freely by 
government and sometimes by development aid organizations. The aim of this piece was to 
look at whether the level of uncertainty matters for decision making, whether there is actual 
demand for weather information, and whether accessing weather information improves 
welfare. 
4.9 Conclusion and policy implications  
The link between behavioural attitudes and technology adoption has been unequivocally 
established in the literature. In agriculture, subjective attitudes toward uncertainty (ambiguity 
aversion) have been shown to play an important role in diminishing agricultural technology 
diffusion among the poor in rural households (Barham at al., 2014; Elabed and Carter, 2015). 
Others show that ambiguity aversion leads to lower well-being outcomes (e.g. Cardenas and 
Carpenter, 2013). Our study extends this strand of literature by showing that information that 
reduces the uncertainty level (objective uncertainty) leads to increased take-up of risky but 
high-yielding technologies and can thus be used to help ambiguity-averse farmers overcome 
their inertia in improved technology adoption. We also show that, with access to information, 
farmers make welfare-improving choices in technology. In the increasingly uncertain 
environment due to climate change, these results are important for policy. Available weather 
information that reduces uncertainty in seasonal outcomes can be a clear pathway towards 
resilience in agricultural production in regions most affected by climate change. 
Borrowing from emerging theoretical literature on the importance of objective uncertainty in 
decision making (e.g. Klibanoff et al., 2005), the analysis begins by showing how objective 
uncertainty (level of uncertainty) in addition to subjective uncertainty (ambiguity aversion) 
affects technology choice. In the next step, the study shows that there is a clear demand for 
uncertainty-reducing information (weather information) among both ambiguity-averse and 
ambiguity-seeking farmers. The wider the uncertainty, the higher the demand for information, 




In the final step of the analysis, we show that expected payoffs of technology choices without 
information differ significantly from expected payoffs of choices with information. Farmers 
who access information make welfare-improving choices compared to those who don’t, 
especially when there is a threat of a climate catastrophe such as drought. The results show that 
these gains in welfare are also cost-effective, considering the amount spent by farmers to 
acquire the information. This is despite the fact that such information ought to be a public good. 
This demonstrates the clear gains in investing in such a policy of climate (weather) information.  
References 
Akay, A., Martinsson, P., Medhin, H., & Trautmann, S. T. (2012). Attitudes toward uncertainty 
among the poor: An experiment in rural Ethiopia. Theory and Decision, 73(3), 453–464. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9250-y 
Alpizar, F., Carlsson, F., & Naranjo, M. A. (2011). The effect of ambiguous risk, and 
coordination on farmers’ adaptation to climate change - A framed field experiment. 
Ecological Economics, 70(12), 2317–2326. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.07.004 
Andrews, T. M., Delton, A. W., & Kline, R. (2018). High-risk high-reward investments to 
mitigate climate change. Nature Climate Change, 8(10), 890–894. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0266-y 
Barham, B. L., Chavas, J. P., Fitz, D., Salas, V. R., & Schechter, L. (2014). The roles of risk 
and ambiguity in technology adoption. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 
97, 204–218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.06.014 
Becker, G. M., Degroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring Utility by a Single-Response 
Sequential Method. Systems Research & Behavioural Science, 9(3), 226–232. 
Becker, S. W., & Brownson, F. O. (1964). What Price Ambiguity? or the Role of Ambiguity 
in Decision-Making. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), 62–73. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0703993104 
Brick, K., & Visser, M. (2015). Risk preferences, technology adoption and insurance uptake: 
A framed experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 118, 383–396. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.02.010 
Cardenas, J. C., & Carpenter, J. (2013). Risk attitudes and economic well-being in Latin 
America. Journal of Development Economics, 103(1), 52–61. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.01.008 




from India. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(1), 104–135. 
Di Falco, S., Veronesi, M., & Yesuf, M. (2011). Does Adaptation to Climate Change Provide 
Food Security? A Micro-Perspective from Ethiopia. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 93(3), 829–846. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aar006 
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2002). Sex Differences and Statistical Sterotyping in Attitudes 
Towards Financial Risk. Evolution and Human Behavior, 23(4), 281–295. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00097-1 
Elabed, G., & Carter, M. R. (2015). Compound-risk aversion, ambiguity and the willingness 
to pay for microinsurance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 118, 150–
166. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.03.002 
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 75(4), 643–669. https://doi.org/Article 
Feder, G., & Umali, D. . (1993). The adoption of agricultural innovations: A review. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 43(3–4), 215–239. 
Ghirardato, P., Maccheroni, F., & Marinacci, M. (2004). Differentiating ambiguity and 
ambiguity attitude. Journal of Economic Theory, 118(2), 133–173. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.004 
Gilboa, I., & Schmeidler, D. (1989). Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-unique Prior. Journal 
of Mathematical Economics, 18, 141–153. 
Giné, X., & Yang, D. (2009). Insurance, credit, and technology adoption: Field experimental 
evidencefrom Malawi. Journal of Development Economics, 89(1), 1–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.09.007 
Hayashi, T., & Wada, R. (2010). Choice with imprecise information: An experimental 
approach. Theory and Decision, 69(3), 355–373. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-
9119-x 
Jumare, H., Visser, M., & Brick, K. (2018). Risk preferences and the poverty trap: A look at 
farm technology uptake among smallholder farmers in the Matzikama Municipality. In 
Economic Research Southern Africa. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315149776 
Klibanoff, P., Marinacci, M., & Mukerji, S. (2005). A Smooth Model of Decision Making 
under Ambiguity. Econometirca, 73(6), 1849–1892. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
0262.2005.00640.x 
Liebenehm, S., & Waibel, H. (2014). Simultaneous estimation of risk and time preferences 
among small-scale cattle farmers in West Africa. American Journal of Agricultural 




Mason, S., Kruczkiewicz, A., Ceccato, P., & Crawford, A. (2015). Accessing and Using 
Climate Data and Information in Fragile , Data-Poor States. (May), 1–27. Retrieved from 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/accessing-climate-data-information-
fragile-data-poor-states.pdf 
Mcintosh, C., Povell, F., & Sadoulet, E. (2015). Utility, Risk, and Demand for Incomplete 
Insurance: Lab Experiments with Guatemalan Cooperatives *. 
Mendelsohn, J., Jarvis, A., Roberts, C., & Robertson, T. (2002). The Atlas of Namibia: A 
Potrait of the land and its people. 
Njau, L. N. (2010). Seasonal-to-interannual climate variability in the context of development 
and delivery of science-based climate prediction and information services worldwide for 
the benefit of society. Procedia Environmental Sciences, 1(1), 411–420. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proenv.2010.09.029 
Pretty, J., Toulmin, C., & Williams, S. (2011). Sustainable intensification in African 
agriculture. International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability, 9(1), 5–24. 
https://doi.org/10.3763/ijas.2010.0583 
Reid, H., Sahlen, L., Stage, J., & MacGregor, J. (2007). The Economic Impact of climate 
change in Namibia. Environmental Economics Programme Discussion Paper 07-02, 
(November), 1–54. 
Ross, N., Santos, P., & Capon, T. (2012). Risk , Ambiguity and the Adoption of New 
Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a developing economy *. International 
Association of Agricultural Economists, (October), 30 p. Retrieved from 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/126492/2/Nross_last_IAAE.pdf 
Singh, C., Daron, J., Bazaz, A., Ziervogel, G., Spear, D., Krishnaswamy, J., … Kituyi, E. 
(2017). The utility of weather and climate information for adaptation decision-making: 
current uses and future prospects in Africa and India. Climate and Development, 0(0), 1–
17. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2017.1318744 
Tadross, M., & Johnston, P. (2012). Climate Systems Regional Report : Southern Africa August 
2012. 
Takahashi, K. (2013). The roles of risk and ambiguity in the adoption of the system of rice 
intensification (SRI): Evidence from Indonesia. Food Security, 5(4), 513–524. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-013-0270-z 
Tall, A., Coulibaly, J. Y., & Diop, M. (2018). Do climate services make a difference? A review 
of evaluation methodologies and practices to assess the value of climate information 





Tonsor, G. T. (2018). Producer decision making under uncertainty: Role of past experiences 
and question framing. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 100(4), 1020–1135. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aay034 
Yates, J. F., & Zukowski, L. G. (1976). Characterization of Ambiguity in Decision-Making. 






Appendix: Experiment design and protocols 
[Large posters including visual aids like flash cards were used for the graphics as presented 
here to support the explanations] 
INTRODUCTION 
My name is [NAME], and I am a researcher with [UNIVERSITY 1 NAME] and 
[UNIVERSITY 2 NAME]. These are my colleagues [NAMES]. We have invited you here so 
you can participate in an experiment with games where you have the opportunity to earn money 
based on the decisions you make. 
INITIAL ENDOWMENT 
There are several games in this experiment. You will have the opportunity to earn money in 
the course of playing these games today. It is also possible to lose some money in some of 
these games. For this reason we will give you a start-up amount of money (which we will call 
your initial wealth) before starting the games, equal to N$150. The money you will receive as 
your initial wealth is enough to cover any of these losses that you may incur. Any additional 
money you earn in the game and also any amount of initial wealth that you don’t spend on 
losses, you can keep and take home with you at the end of this session. 
How much money you earn today depends on the decisions you make during the games. That 
is why it is very important that you understand the rules of the games, which I am going to 
explain to you as we go along. The money you earn today from the games will be paid to 
you at the end of the whole session in cash. 
You play these games as individuals, not in groups. So please don’t talk to anyone while we 
are playing the games. If you have ANY questions at any stage you can just raise your hand 
and someone will come and answer your question privately.   
The exercise today will take three-four hours. Participation in the sessions is voluntary. If 
you decide not to take part, you may leave at any time, even after you have started playing – 
but then you will not earn any money. If you prefer to stay we ask that you sign the form 
that our assistants are bringing around right now indicating your consent to participate in the 
games.  
[HAND OUT THE CONSENT FORMS]   
This form says that you understand participation in these games is voluntary and that you can 
leave whenever you want to. But if you do leave before we have finished playing all the 
games, you won’t receive any money.  
Is everyone finished signing the forms? Ok, someone is going to come around and collect the 
forms from you. [COLLECT FORMS] 
The Games 
As I have said, we will be playing games with real money. At the end of the day, whatever 
money you have earned is yours to keep and take home.  
Let’s talk about how today will work. There are four parts in this experiment; part one has two 
games, part two has three games and part three to four each has five games. Most of these 
games are quite similar as we will see. Everyone will play all the games today. We will indicate 
on the [poster] which games we have played and which are remaining as we go on. 
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Besides the initial wealth that was allocated to you at the start of the session, you will also 
earn money from two of these games; from one game in Part I and any one game from 
Parts 2 to 4. You will only find out which of these games you will be paid for at the end of 
the session! So it is important to play all games as if real money is at stake in every game. 
In total you stand to earn between N$50 and N$375 for today’s activities. Your earnings depend 
on the choices you make in the games. 
PART 1: RISK AND AMBIGUITYAVERSION 
I am now going to explain the rules of games in Part one 
Game 1: 50% probability of High outcome  
Gamble Payoffs ✓ 
Low outcome High outcome 
1 24 24  
2 18 36  
3 12 48  
4 6 60  
5 0 72  
This poster is a large version of the sheet of paper that is in front of you.  
In this game, you must choose from among the 5 gambles [REFER TO POSTER]. There are 
two payoffs for each of these gambles; Low outcome and High outcome.  
If you choose Gamble 1, you will earn N$24 whether the game results in a Low or High 
outcome. If you choose Gamble 2, you will earn N$18 if the game results in a Low outcome 
and N$36 if the game results in a High outcome. If you choose Gamble 3, you will earn N$12 
if the game results in a Low outcome and N$48 if the game results in a High outcome. If you 
choose Gamble 4, you will earn N$6 if the game results in a Low outcome and N$60 if the 
game results in a High outcome. If you choose Gamble 5, you will earn N$0 if the game results 
in a Low outcome and N$72 if the game results in a High outcome. 
As you can see, the amounts earned from the Low outcome decreases as you move from 
Gamble 1 through to Gamble 5; it has decreased from N$24 in Gamble 1 to zero in Gamble 5. 
On the other hand, the amount earned from the High outcome increases as you move from 
Gamble 1 through to Gamble 5; It has increased from N$24 in Gamble 1 to N$72 in Gamble 
5. To illustrate, if you choose Gamble 1, you will earn N$24 whether the game results in High 
or Low outcome but if you choose Gamble 5, you will earn N$72 if the game results in a High 
outcome and earn nothing if the game results in a Low outcome! [EXPLAIN EARNINGS FOR 




To determine whether the game results in a Low or High outcome, we are going to draw a ball 
from this bag [SHOW THE BAG]. There are 10 balls in the bag; FIVE black balls and FIVE 
white balls. If we draw a BLACK ball, then the outcome of the game is High and if we draw a 
WHITE ball, the outcome of the game is Low.  
[DEMONSTRATE DRAWING THE BALL AND INDICATE POSSIBLE EARNINGS]  
Does anyone have any questions before we start? 
Ok, let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet 
where it says experiment number [SHOW WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER].    
Please tick beside the gamble you prefer.  
 
Game 2: Uncertain probability of High outcome 
This game is similar to the one you have just played. The main difference in this game however 
is that the number of BLACK and WHITE balls in the bag is UNKNOWN. Just like before, 
you must choose from among the 5 gambles. Once again, there are two payoffs for each of 
these gambles; Low outcome and High outcome. The BLACK ball is still the one indicating 
High outcome if drawn.  
Just like before, you have a sheet before you resembling the poster in front [POINT AT 
POSTER]. You will tick beside the gamble you prefer. 
Remember, you now have to make your choices without knowing the number of black or white 
balls in the bag. At the end of today’s session, if we draw this game as the game we are paying 
you for, we will reveal how many black balls there are in the bag and then make a draw to see 
if the outcome for the game is High or Low.  
I have with me a spinning wheel with different slices and an arrow with a pointer on top. Each 
slice on the wheel contains a picture of a bag with 10 balls in different combinations of black 
and white; these range from zero black and ten white balls in the bag to ten black and zero 
white balls. We are going to spin this wheel and the ball combination that comes under the 
pointer indicates the number of black and/or white balls that we are going to put in the bag.  
After putting these balls in the bag, one of you will then come up and draw one ball from the 
bag. Remember the bag will only contain TEN balls, and that if a black ball is drawn the 
game outcome is High and if the drawn ball is WHITE, the game outcome is Low.  
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER]. 
Please tick beside the gamble you prefer.  
PART 2-4: Choice of Off-Farm Work OR Farming using Improved or Adaptive Seeds in 
an Uncertain Weather Environment  
Preamble   
Before we start let’s talk about some of the decisions you make in your daily life and 
particularly when it comes to farming decisions. Different periods during the year often calls 
for certain decisions to be made. For example, during rainy seasons, you may have to decide if 
you are going to cultivate crops during that season or just undertake off-farm activities (such 
as working on a government project), if these are available. You may also opt to undertake a 




type of inputs you have to use, key among these being the type of seeds you are going to plant. 
You  may decide to use improved (hybrid) seed, which normally give a very good return when 
there are enough rains during that season, but can also perform very poorly in case the rains 
are not enough or are too much. On the other hand, you may also decide to plant seeds that are 
specifically bred to withstand weather stress (drought or floods). Thus decisions that us as 
farmers make during this period are greatly influenced by our expectations about the weather. 
For example, if we have reason to believe that the rains are going to be good, then we are better 
off using the improved seeds, while on the other hand if we believe the rains will not be 
adequate, then we would better use the adaptive seeds. In case we have off-farm activities, we 
may just decide not to undertake any crop farming that season. It might also be the case that 
someone decides to use a bit of each of these; for example plant some improved seed in some 
plots while in others plant adaptive seed, or do crop cultivation while still involved in an off 
farm activity. 
In the games we will play now, you will be tasked with making decisions involving such 
choices which are similar to what you are doing in your day to day life. However, in this game 
setting we are going to assume that you only make one choice per season; choosing to devote 
your time to off-farm activities or to engage in crop farming where you will either choose to 
plant improved seeds OR drought resistant seeds. 
Weather information 
Understanding the weather patterns for each season is important for farmers in order to decide 
what to plant. While decades of farming experience helps to understand the weather patterns,  
some farmers also rely on traditional methods able to predict the weather. From time to time, 
we receive outside information from government agencies and researchers that tell us PRA the 
weather is going to be like in a particular season i.e. whether it’s going to rain or not. Such 
information is often given by government agencies free of charge.  Sometimes this information 
is lacking and farmers have to rely on their experience in farming to decide what to plant for 
the coming season, not knowing exactly what the weather will be like. While it may not be 
possible to predict EXACTLY what the weather will be like in a coming season,  knowing the 
CHANCE of having good rainfall or drought  in the coming season is helpful in making 
decisions of what to plant.  
In this game we will also give information about the CHANCE of having good or bad weather 
to help you make decisions. 
Instructions 
In the following series of games, in each game you are given a choice between three options; 
working in an off farm activity, or choosing to engage in crop farming where you either choose 
to plant seeds adapted to harsh weather “adaptive seeds”, or you choose to plant improved 
seeds. While in real life it may be possible to do more than one such activity at a time, let us 
for now assume that only one of these can be undertaken at a time.  
What you earn from the off farm activity is not affected by weather outcomes and has a constant 
payoff in good and bad weather.  
The improved seed on the other hand has very high yields if the rainfall is good but in the event 
of low rainfall or droughts, it is possible to make losses given the cost of inputs. On the other 
hand, the seed variety adapted to dry weather conditions has somewhat lower yields than the 
improved seeds during good rainfall, but on the upside, when there is a drought it still gives 




Your task is to choose whether to farm or do off-farm work, and if you farm which seed type 
to plant. You are told that the chance of good rainfall is not known with certainty. Instead,  you 
will be given information about the chance of there being good rainfall or a drought to help 
with your decision making. The chance of getting a good or a bad weather outcome will be 
presented by a bag with black and white balls, where if we draw a black ball from the bag it 
indicates good rainfall and if we draw a white ball it represents bad rainfall or drought 
conditions.   
In some of these games you will be asked to make your decision without having much 
information about the weather conditions. In other games we will give you the option to buy 
information about the chance of having good or poor rainfall which could help you to make 
better decisions.  
Experiment number:_________ 
 
Part 2: Risk Games 
Game 1: 30% probability of good weather 
You are going to make a choice among three livelihood options; off-farm work, farming using 
seeds adapted to harsh weather “adaptive seeds” or farming using improved seeds. [POINT TO 
POSTER]. The pay offs for each choice depend on how the weather turns out to be in this 
season.  
Note that you are only going to make ONE CHOICE; so you either have to choose off-farm 
work; farming using adaptive seeds or farming using improved seeds. The off farm work option 
has constant payoffs, meaning it does not matter what the weather turns out to be, you always 
get N$75. On the other hand, for the adaptive seed option you earn N$150 if the season has 
good rains or N$25 if the rainfall is poor. So it has a higher payoff in case of good weather than 
in the case of bad weather, but you still get to earn some money either way. The improved seed 
option will give a very high pay off if its good weather but if the weather is bad you will make 
a loss (N$225 in case of good rains or –N$25 in case of bad rains). 
To determine whether the season will have good rainfall (good weather) or poor rainfall (bad 
weather), we are going to make a draw from TEN balls in this bag. The bag contains THREE 
black and SEVEN white balls. A draw of a BLACK ball implies that the season has GOOD 
rains, while a draw of a WHITE ball implies the season has BAD rains or drought conditions.  








Off-farm work 75 75  
Adaptive seeds 150 25  




EXAMPLE: So, if you choose the off-farm activity option, you will earn N$75 whether the 
colour of the ball we draw is black or white (whether good or bad weather). If you choose the 
adaptive seeds  and we draw a black ball (good weather), you earn N$150, but if we draw a 
white ball (bad weather), you earn N$25.  Let’s say you choose the improved seed option and 
we draw a black ball (good weather), you earn N$225. If we draw a white ball (bad weather), 
you incur a debt of N$25!  
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 
mark next to your choice. You can only choose one of these options! 
Game 2: 50% probability of good weather 
Again you are going to make a choice among three livelihood options; off-farm work, farming 
using seeds adapted to harsh weather “adaptive seeds” or farming using improved seeds. 
[POINT TO POSTER]. The pay offs for each choice depend on how the weather turns out to 
be in this season.  
Just like previous time, you are only going to make ONE CHOICE; so you either have to 
choose off-farm work; farming using adaptive seeds or farming using improved seeds. The off 
farm work option has constant payoffs, meaning it does not matter what the weather turns out 
to be, you always get N$75. On the other hand, for the adaptive seed option you earn N$150 if 
the season has good rains or N$25 if the rainfall is poor. So it has a higher payoff in case of 
good weather than in the case of bad weather, but you still get to earn some money either way. 
The improved seed option will give a very high pay off if its good weather but if the weather 
is bad you will make a loss (N$225 in case of good rains or –N$25 in case of bad rains). 
To determine whether the season will have good rainfall (good weather) or poor rainfall (bad 
weather), we are going to make a draw from TEN balls in this bag. The bag now contains FIVE 
black and FIVE white balls. A draw of a BLACK ball implies that the season has GOOD rains, 
while a draw of a WHITE ball implies the season has BAD rains or drought conditions.  
[DEMONSTRATE NUMBER OF BALLS IN BAG AND DRAW IMPLICATIONS]  
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 
mark next to your choice. You can only choose one of these options! 
Game 3: 70% probability of good weather 
Again you are going to make a choice among three livelihood options; off-farm work, farming 
using seeds adapted to harsh weather “adaptive seeds” or farming using improved seeds. 
[POINT TO POSTER]. The pay offs for each choice depend on how the weather turns out to 
be in this season.  
Just like previous time, you are only going to make ONE CHOICE; so you either have to 
choose off-farm work; farming using adaptive seeds or farming using improved seeds. The off 
farm work option has constant payoffs, meaning it does not matter what the weather turns out 
to be, you always get N$75. On the other hand, for the adaptive seed option you earn N$150 if 
the season has good rains or N$25 if the rainfall is poor. So it has a higher payoff in case of 
good weather than in the case of bad weather, but you still get to earn some money either way. 
The improved seed option will give a very high pay off if its good weather but if the weather 




To determine whether the season will have good rainfall (good weather) or poor rainfall (bad 
weather), we are going to make a draw from TEN balls in this bag. The bag now contains 
SEVEN black and THREE white balls. A draw of a BLACK ball implies that the season has 
GOOD rains, while a draw of a WHITE ball implies the season has BAD rains or drought 
conditions.  
[DEMONSTRATE NUMBER OF BALLS IN BAG AND DRAW IMPLICATIONS]  
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 
mark next to your choice. You can only choose one of these options! 
Part 3: Uncertainty Games 
The games in this part are similar to ones you just completed. The only difference is that unlike 
before, the probability of good weather is now not known precisely. You will make decisions 
based on information given in each game indicating the possible range within which the precise 
probability of good weather might lie. 
Game 1: 0-100% probability of good weather 
Again, you are going to make a choice among three livelihood options; off-farm work, farming 
using seeds adapted to harsh weather “adaptive seeds” or farming using improved seeds. 
[POINT TO POSTER]. The pay offs for each choice depend on how the weather turns out to 
be in this season.  
Just like before, to determine whether the season will have good rainfall (good weather) or 
poor rainfall (bad weather), we are going to make a draw from TEN balls in this bag, where a 
BLACK ball implies that the season has GOOD rains and  a draw of a WHITE ball implies the 
season has BAD rains or drought conditions. In this game however, we do not know how 
many white or black balls are in the bag. In other words, we do not know precisely what the 
chances are of the weather in a season being  good, or being bad. 
After you have each made a choice among the three livelihood options [POINT AGAIN TO 
THE POSTER], we will use a spinning wheel to determine the number of black and white balls 
to put in the bag. We will then make a draw from a bag to determine the weather outcome . 
Now, this is how we are going to determine the information on the chance of good or bad 
weather at the end of the session. I have with me a spinning wheel divided into different 
segments. On each segment is a picture of a bag containing 10 balls with different combinations 
of black and white balls. We are going to spin this wheel and the when the wheel stops turning, 
the picture that ends up under this arrow indicates the number of black and/or white balls that 
we must put in the bag.  
[DEMONSTRATE USING THE SPINNING WHEEL] 
Remember the bag will only contain TEN balls, and that if a black ball is drawn it 
indicates good weather. If the arrow points at the bag with no black balls, we are going to put 
ten white balls in the bag, and no black ball, meaning that there will be no chance of good rains 
this season. If the arrow points at the bag with 10 black balls, we are going to put ten black 
balls in the bag and no white ball, meaning there is no chance of bad rains this season. If the 
arrow points to the bag with five black balls, we are going to put five black balls in the bag and 
five white balls, meaning there is an even chance of good rains this season. This is similar for 




Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 
mark next to your choice. You can only choose one of these options! 
Game 2: 20% to 40% probability of good weather 
This game is similar to one played before. The only difference is that now we have some 
information of the range of probabilities within which good rains may occur in the season. To 
demonstrate this chance of good weather, the bag will contain either two black and eight white 
balls, three black and seven white balls, OR four black and six white ball. [DEMONSTRATE 
THIS]. Just like before, a draw of a BLACK ball implies that the season has GOOD rains, 
while a draw of a WHITE ball implies the season has BAD rains.  
Again, we will use a spinning wheel to determine the number of black and white balls to 
put in the bag. We will then make a draw from a bag to determine the weather outcome. 
The spinning wheel now is divided into different segments each with a picture of a bag 
containing TEN balls ranging from two to four black balls. We are going to spin this wheel and 
when the wheel stops turning, the picture that ends up under this arrow indicates the number 
of black and white balls that we must put in the bag. Remember the bag will only contain 
TEN balls, and that if a black ball is drawn it indicates good weather. If the arrow points 
at the bag with two black balls, we are going to put two black and eight white balls in the bag, 
meaning that there will be a very small chance of good rains this season. If the arrow points at 
the bag with three black balls, we are going to put three black and seven white balls in the bag, 
meaning there is a small chance of good rains this season. If the arrow points to the bag with 
four black balls, we are going to put four black and six white balls in the bag, meaning there is 
a somewhat larger chance of good rains this season. This is similar for all other numbers on 
the wheel. [REPEAT THIS SECTION]. 
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 
mark next to your choice. You can only choose one of these options! 
Game 3: 10% to 50% probability of good weather 
This game is similar to one played before. The only difference is that now we have some 
information of the range of probabilities within which good rains may occur in the season. To 
demonstrate this chance of good weather, the bag will contain either one black and nine white 
balls, two black and eight white balls, three black and seven white balls, four black and six 
white balls OR five black and five white balls. [DEMONSTRATE THIS]. Just like before, a 
draw of a BLACK ball implies that the season has GOOD rains, while a draw of a WHITE ball 
implies the season has BAD rains or drought conditions.  
Again, we will use a spinning wheel to determine the number of black and white balls to 
put in the bag. We will then make a draw from a bag to determine the weather outcome. 
The spinning wheel now is divided into different segments each with a picture of a bag 
containing TEN balls ranging from one to five black balls. We are going to spin this wheel and 
the when the wheel stops turning, the picture that ends up under this arrow indicates the number 
of black balls that we must put in the bag. Remember the bag will only contain TEN balls, 
and that if a black ball is drawn it indicates good weather. If the arrow points at the bag 




there will be a very small chance of good rains this season. If the arrow points at the bag with 
two black balls, we are going to put two black and eight white balls in the bag, meaning that 
there is still a small chance of good rains this season. If the arrow points at the bag with three 
black balls, we are going to put three black and seven white balls in the bag, meaning there is 
a somewhat small chance of good rains this season. If the arrow points at the bag with four 
black balls, we are going to put four black and six white balls in the bag, meaning there is an 
improved chance of good rains this season. If the arrow points to the bag with five black balls, 
we are going to put five black and five white balls in the bag, meaning there is an even chance 
of good or bad rains this season. This is similar for all other numbers on the wheel. [REPEAT 
THIS SECTION]. 
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 
mark next to your choice. You can only choose one of these options! 
Game 4: 60% to 80% probability of good weather 
This game is similar to one played before. The only difference is that now we have some 
information of the range of probabilities within which good rains may occur in the season. To 
demonstrate this chance of good weather, the bag will contain either six black and four white 
balls, seven black and three white balls, OR eight black and two white balls [DEMONSTRATE 
THIS]. Just like before, a draw of a BLACK ball implies that the season has GOOD rains, 
while a draw of a WHITE ball implies the season has BAD rains or drought conditions.  
Again, we will use a spinning wheel to determine the number of black and white balls to 
put in the bag. We will then make a draw from a bag to determine the weather outcome. 
The spinning wheel now is divided into different segments each with a picture of a bag 
containing TEN balls ranging from six to eight black balls. We are going to spin this wheel and 
the when the wheel stops turning, the picture that ends up under this arrow indicates the number 
of black balls that we must put in the bag. Remember the bag will only contain TEN balls, 
and that if a black ball is drawn it indicates good weather. If the arrow points at the bag 
with six black balls, we are going to put six black and four white balls in the bag, meaning that 
there will be a slightly higher chance of good rains this season. If the arrow points to the bag 
with eight black balls, we are going to put eight black and two white balls in the bag, meaning 
there is a very high chance of good this season. This is similar for all other numbers on the 
wheel. [REPEAT THIS SECTION]. 
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 
mark next to your choice. You can only choose one of these options! 
Game 5: 50% to 90% probability of good weather 
This game is similar to one played before. The only difference is that now we have some 
information of the range of probabilities within which good rains may occur in the season. To 
demonstrate this chance of good weather, the bag will contain either five black and five white 
balls, six black and four white balls, seven black and three white balls, eight black and two 
white balls, OR nine black balls and one white ball [DEMONSTRATE THIS]. Just like before, 
a draw of a BLACK ball implies that the season has GOOD rains, while a draw of a WHITE 




Again, we will use a spinning wheel to determine the number of black and white balls to 
put in the bag. We will then make a draw from a bag to determine the weather outcome. 
The spinning wheel now is divided into different segments each with a picture of a bag 
containing TEN balls ranging from five to nine black balls. We are going to spin this wheel 
and the when the wheel stops turning, the picture that ends up under this arrow indicates the 
number of black balls that we must put in the bag. Remember the bag will only contain TEN 
balls, and that if a black ball is drawn it indicates good weather. If the arrow points at the 
bag with five black balls, we are going to put five black and five white balls in the bag, meaning 
that there will be an even chance of good or bad rains this season. If the arrow points to the bag 
with nine black balls, we are going to put nine black balls and only one white ball in the bag, 
meaning there is an extremely high chance of good rains this season. This is similar for all 
other numbers on the wheel. [REPEAT THIS SECTION]. 
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 
mark next to your choice. You can only choose one of these options! 
PART 4: Willingness to Pay for Weather Information and Choice after Information 
INSTRUCTIONS  
The games in these parts are similar to ones you have been playing. Again, you will be asked 
to make a decision about three livelihood options (off-farm work, farming using drought 
resistant or “adaptive seeds” and farming using improved seeds), and as before you have to 
make this decision not knowing what the exact chances of good weather are. However, this 
time you have the option to purchase information that tells you what the chances of good 
or bad weather are. By paying for this information, you are going to be given precise 
information about the chance of getting good or bad rains. You are thus given a chance to play 
the game knowing the exact number of the black and white balls in the bag. 
Like before, we use the spinning wheel to determine the precise probability of good weather; 
this time however, we can reveal this information to you before you make your choice, if 
you pay enough for it. If you feel that this information will be valuable for you to make your 
decision, you can use some of your initial wealth to purchase the information. The cost of this 
weather information ranges from zero to twenty five Namibian dollars (N$0 to N$25).  
In the answer sheet given to you, you will indicate the amount you want to put down as payment 
for this weather information, ranging from N$0 to N$25. After we have collected your answer 
sheets, we are going to make a draw from this pack of 26 cards in my hand, to determine the 
actual cost of information. The cards are labelled from 0 to 25 [SHOW THE CARDS WITH 
NUMBERS WRITTEN ON THEM]. The number on the card that is drawn will be the cost of 
the weather information.  
 
Experiment number: _________ 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
✓                           
 
If the amount of money you indicated on the answer sheet is less than the number on the 




will have to make your choice about which of the three livelihood options (off-farm work, 
farming using drought resistant or “adaptive seeds” and farming using improved seeds) to pick,  
without having any information about the number of white and/or black balls in the bag. Also, 
you will not have to pay anything if the amount you indicate on the answer sheet was less than 
the actual price that we drew from the pack of cards.  
On the other hand, if you indicated the amount of money you are willing to pay to receive 
information as equal to, or greater than the number on the card we drew from the bag, 
you will receive information on the chances of good or bad weather before you choose the 
livelihood option. In other words, you will be told the number of black and white coloured balls 
in the bag before you make your choice among the three livelihood options. The cost of the 
information (which will range from 0-25) is equal to the number on the card we draw 
from the pack of cards. You will pay for this information from your initial wealth. 
Game 1a: WTP for weather information (0%-100% probability range) 
This game is similar to one you played where the chances of good whether are completely 
unknown. In other words, you have no idea how many black or white balls are in the bag. There 
could be all black and no white balls in the bag indicating chances of good weather are certain, 
or there could also be all white balls and no black ball in the bag indicating chances of bad 
weather are certain. There could be all other different combinations of black and white balls in 
the bag. [DEMONSTRATE THIS] 
You will indicate how much you would like to pay for information to know how many black 
balls (chances of good weather) there are in the bag before you make your choice, in this 
particular case where the chances are completely unknown.  
Are there any questions?  
Ok, let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet 
where it says experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR 
NUMBER]. 
Indicate (tick) the amount you are willing to pay on the sheet provided. 
Game 1b: Choice after weather information round (0%-100% probability range) 
After your WTP choice and the draw of the actual cost of information, we have determined 
who is receiving information before making a livelihood choice. If you are among those 
receiving the information, we are going to hand you an envelope including a picture of a bag 
with 10 balls, showing you how many black and white balls there are in the bag. Do not 
reveal this picture to anyone else. If you are not receiving information, you will also receive 
this envelope but there will be no information inside. Everybody will then make their decisions. 
Check the envelope handed to you and use the information inside to help you choose a 
livelihood option, given the chance of good weather as contained in the information in the 
envelope. If you have received an empty envelope, it means you did not qualify to receive 
information and are required to make a choice without information on the precise number of 
black or white balls in the bag.  
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 
mark next to your choice. You can only choose one of these options! 




This game is similar to one you just played. You have some information that the chances of 
good weather lie between 20% and 40%. In other words, there could be two black and eight 
white balls in the bag, three black and seven white balls in the bag OR four black and six white 
balls in the bag.  [DEMONSTRATE THIS] 
You will indicate how much you would like to pay for information to know precisely how 
many black balls (chances of good weather) there are in the bag before you make your choice, 
in this particular case where the chances lie between 20% and 40%.  
Are there any questions?  
Ok, let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet 
where it says experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR 
NUMBER]. 
Indicate (tick) the amount you are willing to pay on the sheet provided. 
Game 2b: Choice after weather information round (20%-40% probability range) 
Again, we have determined who is receiving information before making a livelihood choice. 
Just like before, if you are among those receiving the information, we are going to hand you 
an envelope including a picture of a bag with 10 balls, showing you how many black and white 
balls there are in the bag. Do not reveal this picture to anyone else. If you are not receiving 
information, you will also receive this envelope but there will be no information inside. 
Everybody will then make their decisions. 
Check the envelope handed to you and use the information inside to help you choose a 
livelihood option, given the chance of good weather as contained in the information in the 
envelope. If you have received an empty envelope, it means you did not qualify to receive 
information in this game and are required to make a choice without information on the precise 
number of black or white balls in the bag.  
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 
mark next to your choice. You can only choose one of these options! 
Game 3a: WTP for weather information (10%-50% probability range) 
This game is similar to one you just played. You have some information that the chances of 
good weather lie between 10% and 50%. In other words, there could be one black and nine 
white balls in the bag, two black and eight white balls in the bag, three black and seven white 
balls in the bag, four black and six white balls in the bag OR five black and five white balls in 
the bag.  [DEMONSTRATE THIS] 
You will indicate how much you would like to pay for information to know precisely how 
many black balls (chances of good weather) there are in the bag before you make your choice, 
in this particular case where the chances lie between 10% and 50%.  
Are there any questions?  
Ok, let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet 
where it says experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR 
NUMBER]. 
Indicate (tick) the amount you are willing to pay on the sheet provided. 




Again, we have determined who is receiving information before making a livelihood choice. 
Just like before, if you are among those receiving the information, we are going to hand you 
an envelope including a picture of a bag with 10 balls, showing you how many black and white 
balls there are in the bag. Do not reveal this picture to anyone else. If you are not receiving 
information, you will also receive this envelope but there will be no information inside. 
Everybody will then make their decisions. 
Check the envelope handed to you and use the information inside to help you choose a 
livelihood option, given the chance of good weather as contained in the information in the 
envelope. If you have received an empty envelope, it means you did not qualify to receive 
information in this game and are required to make a choice without information on the precise 
number of black or white balls in the bag.  
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 
mark next to your choice. You can only choose one of these options! 
Game 4a: WTP for weather information (60%-80% probability range) 
This game is similar to one you just played. You have some information that the chances of 
good weather lie between 60% and 80%. In other words, there could be six black and four 
white balls in the bag, seven black and three white balls in the bag OR eight black and two 
white balls in the bag.  [DEMONSTRATE THIS] 
You will indicate how much you would like to pay for information to know precisely how 
many black balls (chances of good weather) there are in the bag before you make your choice, 
in this particular case where the chances lie between 60% and 80%.  
Are there any questions?  
Ok, let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet 
where it says experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR 
NUMBER]. 
Indicate (tick) the amount you are willing to pay on the sheet provided. 
Game 4b: Choice after weather information round (60%-80% probability range) 
Again, we have determined who is receiving information before making a livelihood choice. 
Just like before, if you are among those receiving the information, we are going to hand you 
an envelope including a picture of a bag with 10 balls, showing you how many black and white 
balls there are in the bag. Do not reveal this picture to anyone else. If you are not receiving 
information, you will also receive this envelope but there will be no information inside. 
Everybody will then make their decisions. 
Check the envelope handed to you and use the information inside to help you choose a 
livelihood option, given the chance of good weather as contained in the information in the 
envelope. If you have received an empty envelope, it means you did not qualify to receive 
information in this game and are required to make a choice without information on the precise 
number of black or white balls in the bag.  
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 




Game 5a: WTP for weather information (50%-90% probability range) 
This game is similar to one you just played. You have some information that the chances of 
good weather lie between 50% and 90%. In other words, there could be five black and five 
white balls in the bag, six black and four white balls in the bag, seven black and three white 
balls in the bag, eight black and two white balls in the bag, OR nine black and one white ball 
in the bag.  [DEMONSTRATE THIS] 
You will indicate how much you would like to pay for information to know precisely how 
many black balls (chances of good weather) there are in the bag before you make your choice, 
in this particular case where the chances lie between 50% and 90%.  
Are there any questions?  
Ok, let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet 
where it says experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR 
NUMBER]. 
Indicate (tick) the amount you are willing to pay on the sheet provided. 
Game 4b: Choice after weather information round (50%-90% probability range) 
Again, we have determined who is receiving information before making a livelihood choice. 
Just like before, if you are among those receiving the information, we are going to hand you 
an envelope including a picture of a bag with 10 balls, showing you how many black and white 
balls there are in the bag. Do not reveal this picture to anyone else. If you are not receiving 
information, you will also receive this envelope but there will be no information inside. 
Everybody will then make their decisions. 
Check the envelope handed to you and use the information inside to help you choose a 
livelihood option, given the chance of good weather as contained in the information in the 
envelope. If you have received an empty envelope, it means you did not qualify to receive 
information in this game and are required to make a choice without information on the precise 
number of black or white balls in the bag.  
Are there any questions? [CHECK TO SEE ALL HAVE UNDERSTOOD] 
Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet where it says 
experiment number [GESTURE TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER], then 






5 Summary of key findings, general conclusions and policy implications, 
and directions for future research 
The essays in this thesis chapters look into barriers and enablers/interventions that have the 
potential of enhancing adoption of climate change adaptation and sustainable agricultural 
intensification practices (SAIPs). In this final chapter, a summary of key findings from these 
studies presented as well as general conclusions and areas identified that can benefit from future 
research.  
5.1 Key chapter findings 
Chapter two assesses the barriers of- and enablers to farm diversification (both livestock and 
crop enterprises) as an adaptation strategy to climate change in semi-arid areas, and evaluates the 
implications of this diversification to household food security outcomes. The key Chapter findings 
are that past exposure to climatic shocks and access to climate information are instrumental in 
explaining extent of diversification in both livestock and crop farming. These findings are similar 
to those from Chapter one that climate (weather information) provision is a key success factor to 
climate change adaptation and sustainable intensification. Further, classical barriers to technology 
adoption including low education levels for the household head, female headed-households and 
credit constraints were also found to be binding for farm diversification in the study area.  
The study also evaluated the effect of diversification levels and food security in the region. The 
evidence provided in the chapter show that the higher the extent of farm diversification in a 
household, the more food secure that household is. Diversification in both livestock and crop 
farming is associated with high per capita monthly food expenditures and household dietary 
diversity scores (HDDS). The study finds no evidence that high diversification in either crop or 
livestock farming relative to the other leads to higher food security outcomes, households highly 
diversified in both are shown to achieve higher food security outcomes compared to their 
counterparts.  
Chapter three set out to test if the emergence of large grain traders in smallholder farmer grain 
markets in Kenya has an effect on the uptake of sustainable intensification inputs like fertilizer, 
manure and climate-stress resilient seeds (improved seeds). The study shows that adoption of 
improved seeds and manure is persistent and once farmers start using these, they continue using 




finds no evidence that large grain sales affect improved seed and manure takeup, there is 
overwhelming evidence that these sales result in high uptake of inorganic fertilizer.  
As indentified in the conceptual framework, the services rendered by these market actors to 
farmers include provision of inputs on credit, advisory services and mitigation of marketing risks 
by availing a ready market and stable prices to the farmers. All these are ways which could be 
driving the observed positive relationship between sales to large gran traders and adoption of 
fertilizer. The study employed methods that correct for endogeneity in self selection and reverse 
causality, thus the ability to claim causality with a high degree of confidence on the observed 
positive relationship. Classical barriers to technology uptake like household head level of 
schooling and gender, liquidity constraints and accessibility of extension advise are also shown to 
play a significant role in the adoption of these sustainable intensification inputs, alongside the key 
explanatory variable, sales to large grain traders.  
Chapter four sought to understand how climate change-induced uncertainty impacts farming 
households’ decision making on livelihoood choices and technology uptake. The key findings in 
this chapter show that weather uncertainty leads to sub-optimal choices that decrease a 
household’s welfare outcomes in the face of climate change; the higher the level of weather 
uncertainty, the low the welfare outcomes from observed choices. The study also establishes that 
there is a high demand for weather information that reduces this uncertainty, and that provision 
of weather information enables farmers to make welfare improving choices, even in the presence 
of climatic shocks like drought. The chapter thus identifies provision of weather information as a 
key success factor in the effort to enhance adoption of technologies (e.g. improved seeds) that are 
adaptive to climate change and promote sustainable agricultural intensification. 
5.2 General conclusions and policy implications 
This dissertation identifies new pathways for enhancing adoption of climate change adaptation 
and sustainable agricultural intensification strategies, as well as provides evidence that pathways 
established in the literature also work in regions that form part of the studies sites. Chapter 1 shows 
that availing weather related information to farmers during planting seasons help them in choosing 
the right technologies given the seasonal weather forecasts. These choices lead to improved 
household welfare. Chapter 2 further identifies provision of climate change-related crop and 
livestock management information as key to enhancing take up of improved seed and overall farm 
diversification. Improved seeds and farm diversification are established risk management 




change adaptation. Thus these key findings point to the need for a comprehensive information 
policy encompassing short and long term weather information and the appropriate response 
strategies available in both crop and livestock farming enterprises to withstand any stressors 
associated with the predicted weather outcomes. These include appropriate seed technologies and 
diversifications in crop and livestock enterprises for creating resilience in the production systems 
to withstand climatic shocks.  
As shown in Chapter 3 of the dissertation, the emergence of large grain traders in smallholder 
farm markets helps in incentivizing the use of inorganic fertilizer at household level. This provides 
evidence of a new pathway for policy interventions aimed at enhancing uptake of sustainable 
agricultural intensification at smallholder farms. Private companies engaged in large grain 
business can be used as conduits of services like input, credit and extension information provision 
through public-private partnerships. This could be a cost effective and efficient intervention 
compared to others like direct input provision by the government that are bedevilled with 
bureaucracy, moral hazards and corruption. In addition, one large private trader can reach many 
farmers per interaction and the services are also demand driven, eliminating inefficiencies.  
The study also shows that access to land is a key success factor for farmer engagement with these 
types of market actors. Owners of considerably bigger tracts of land are therefore advantaged to 
engage with large grain traders, compared to those who own small pieces, most likely due to 
economies of scale in production and marketing. To make engagements between owners of small 
farms and large grain traders possible, government can subsidize these actors’ costs and act as an 
insurer for bad debts, which enables them to lend credit to a section of market who are most at 
risk to default. Such arrangements have been successful elsewhere, for example in provision of 
index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) in Kenya wher government has partnered with private 
insurance companies, or the similar index-based weather insurance for crops, which has had mixed 
fortunes as a potential vehicle for climate change adaptation.     
Other key findings point to the need for policies targeted to particular segments of the society to 
enable populations within these segments access farming risk management strategies. For 
example, female-headed households are shown throughout the dissertation studies to consistently 
adopt less technology than male-headed ones. The literature reviewed in these studies paint a 
picture of female-headed households being stuck in poverty traps characterized by low income 
earning opportunities, land tenure arrangements skewed against women land ownership, and low 
ownership of assets, some key for dissemination of information like radios. A policy of credit 




This could be micro-finance institutions lending to women at discounted rates and subsidized by 
the government or development partners, shown to improve women empowerment elsewhere. 
Studies elsewhere have also shown higher impact of projects where the recipient pool is made up 
of women, for example livestock disbursed to females to spur female ownership of the asset.  
On the other hand, investments in education of the rural population results in higher adaptation 
take up. Outside farm diversification, this is also critical for other adaptation strategies not 
addressed in the study like migration where educated migrants are shown to earn more and also 
send higher remittances home, given the high income opportunities they have in off-farm 
employment. Thus for a broader adaptive capacity of the rural population, especially in Namibia 
where rural education levels are shown to be very low, policies geared towards access to education 
by the rural poor needs prioritizing. 
5.3 Future research  
In Chapter two, the study only touches on farm diversification (livestock and crop) as a strategy 
to coping with climate change. As earlier stated, Namibia is projected to be highly impacted by 
climate change and there has been a steady migration of people in search of non-farm activities. 
How does diversification of households in the region into all three activities i.e. crop, livestock 
and non-farm, affect welfare of migrants (e.g. through access to non-farm incomes in non-farm 
sectors) and non-migrants (through loss of extra farm labour and access to remittances from the 
emigrating household members)? With access to a rich household and indivial panel data, this 
would be an interesting area of research. Accessing such data is however both time consuming 
and expensive, but might be necessary as a government undertaking for future policy making. 
This is especially important for Namibia where such datasets are non-existent and which faces a 
significant challenge posed by the changing climate. 
I also acknowledge areas of limitation in Chapter three that could benefit from further research.  
First, my definition of large grain traders (LGTs) solely relies on farmers recall and their ability 
to identify the type of traders that they sold their grain to. Future studies on this aspect may need 
to find a more robust way of identifying these market actors. Secondly, the study relies on few 
observations for households selling their grain to LGTs across the panel, given that these types of 
market traders are still making incursions in the small-holder grain markets. Thus, while the 
results from our analysis offer useful insights especially in this understudied area and given the 
potential important role that LGT can play in farm production decisions, the low numbers of LGTs 




Lastly, To evaluate the role of weather information in farming decision making in Chapter four, 
the study utilized a framed field experiment. The framing of the weather uncertainty scenarios and 
introducing the possibility of reducing this uncertainty through provision of weather information 
gave important insights on demand for this information, and choices made after accessing the 
information. It would be interesting to assess how these choices play out in the real world. An 
area of further research to this end could be in the form of a randomized control trial (RCT) 
intervention where weather information is disseminated to treatment groups then real farming 
choices are observed. Further, while the study assessed how availing weather information can 
help farmers make better farming decisions, the study did not go further to look into what would 
happen if the provided information turned out to be incorrect, as it so happens in most cases in 
sub-Saharan Africa where weather prediction is usually not precise. Does this lead to loss of trust 
and future non-use of weather information coming from meteorological weather stations? This is 
an empirical question that could be interesting to explore to explain why farmers do not use 
weather information even in countries where this is often provided. 
 
